219 A.3d 1083
Pa.2019Background
- Kenneth and Theresa Ramondo built and used a paved driveway that begins on their neighbor Bartkowskis’ 25-ft “pole” and continues onto their own pole to reach Garrett Mill Road; the poles are adjacent flag‑lot access strips.
- The driveway was built in 1992 without a recorded easement over the Mansmann/Bartkowski pole; neighbors did not object when it was placed.
- The Ramondos’ pole has severe physical and regulatory obstacles (stream, floodplain, steep slopes, utility pole, township and DEP restrictions) that experts disagree on whether a driveway could practicably be constructed there.
- Bartkowskis sued for ejectment/trespass; Ramondos counterclaimed for various property rights, including an easement by necessity and by implication.
- Trial court found an easement by implication for the Ramondos but denied easement by necessity (requiring impossibility); Superior Court reversed the implication ruling and affirmed denial of necessity; Supreme Court granted review on whether necessity requires proving impossibility of alternative access.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ramondo) | Defendant's Argument (Bartkowski) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an easement by necessity requires proving absolute impossibility of alternative access | Regulatory and physical barriers make access on Ramondo pole practically impossible; strict necessity satisfied; if zoning relief is required, impose a presumption of necessity or shift burden to servient owner | Competing expert shows construction is feasible; plaintiff failed to prove impossibility; credibility supports denial | Court: No. "Strict necessity" does not mean literal impossibility; court must assess practicability (cost, topography, regulatory likelihood). Reverse Superior Court on this legal point and remand. |
| Whether burden should shift to servient owner when regulatory relief is required | Once plaintiff shows regulatory relief is necessary, burden should shift to servient owner to prove relief is available | Plaintiff retains burden to prove necessity; servient owner need not disprove speculative impossibilities | Court rejects a per se presumption or automatic burden‑shift; plaintiff must prove necessity through evidence, including expert opinion and likelihood of overcoming regulatory hurdles. |
| Whether an easement by implication was established (unity/severance) | Long‑standing use before severance from common grantor created an implied easement | Corporation ownership and timing undermine unity; trial court erred finding unity/severance as required | Superior Court vacated trial court's implication ruling. Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings (necessity standard clarified; implication/unity/severance remain fact issues on remand). |
Key Cases Cited
- Ogden v. Grove, 38 Pa. 487 (Pa. 1861) (articulates that a right‑of‑way by necessity is of "strict necessity" and not based on convenience)
- Youst v. Keck’s Food Serv., Inc., 94 A.3d 1057 (Pa. Super. 2014) (sets elements for easement by necessity)
- Graff v. Scanlan, 673 A.2d 1028 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (easement by necessity must exist at severance and at exercise)
- MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 739 P.2d 414 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (practical impossibility/expense—rather than literal impossibility—can satisfy necessity)
- Condry v. Laurie, 41 A.2d 66 (Md. 1945) (cost disproportionate to land value may justify easement despite physical possibility)
- In re Private Road in Speers Boro, II, Washington Cty., 11 A.3d 902 (Pa. 2011) (under Private Roads Act, "strictest necessity" is required but literal impossibility not mandated)