Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69

Kate and David Bartenwerfer jointly bought and renovated a San Francisco house as partners; David managed the project and Kate was largely uninvolved.
They sold the house to Buckley, represented they had disclosed material facts, but concealed defects (roof, windows, permit issues); Buckley sued and obtained a >$200,000 state-court judgment against both.
The Bartenwerfers filed Chapter 7; Buckley filed an adversary proceeding arguing the judgment debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) (debts for money "obtained by" fraud).
Bankruptcy Court found David committed fraud and imputed his intent to Kate under partnership principles; later proceedings found Kate lacked actual knowledge and could discharge her share, and the BAP affirmed that knowledge-based standard.
Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on Strang v. Bradner: a partner’s fraud is imputed and §523(a)(2)(A) bars discharge even for an innocent partner; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question.
Supreme Court held §523(a)(2)(A) bars discharge of debts obtained by fraud regardless of the individual debtor’s personal culpability when liability derives from another’s fraud (e.g., agent or partner within scope).

Issue	Buckley (Plaintiff) Argument	Bartenwerfer (Defendant) Argument	Held
Does §523(a)(2)(A) bar discharge when the debt was obtained by another’s fraud?	Yes — debt obtained by fraud is nondischargeable regardless of which actor committed it.	No — ordinary reading requires the debtor’s own fraud; passive voice implies debtor as actor.	Yes — statute’s passive phrasing focuses on how money was obtained, not on the specific actor.
Do neighboring subsections (A vs B/C) require debtor culpability?	(Implicit) Subsections differ; (A) doesn't require debtor intent so applies broadly.	(Argues) B/C’s express debtor-focused language shows (A) requires debtor’s own fraud.	The omission is deliberate; (B)/(C) expressly require debtor acts while (A) is actor-agnostic.
Does precedent and Congress’s subsequent legislation support imputation?	Strang and later congressional amendments endorse imputation to partners/agents.	Strang is outdated or limited; textual focus should control.	Strang stands; Congress deleted "of the bankrupt" later, signaling acceptance of Strang’s rule.
Does application conflict with bankruptcy’s fresh-start policy?	Creditors’ interest can outweigh fresh-start; policy balance favors nondischarge here.	Imposing liability on innocent debtors defeats fresh-start and is unfair.	Policy does not override clear statutory text and common-law agency/partnership rules; defenses and state-law limits remain available.

Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885) (partner’s fraud imputed to co-partners; fraud’s fruits attributed to all)
Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009) (statutory passive voice can focus on an event rather than actor intent)
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995) (interpreting §523(a)(2)(A) with reference to common-law fraud principles)
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (context can limit passive-voice actor inference)
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267 (2013) (interpretive principle that exceptions to discharge should be confined to their terms)
Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915) (textual limits on exceptions to discharge)
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (statutory interpretation of discharge exceptions)
Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007) (contextual reading of passive constructions)
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (bankruptcy’s fresh-start balanced against statutory exceptions)
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (creditors’ interest may outweigh debtor’s fresh start)
Husky Int'l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U.S. 356 (2016) (statutory incorporation of common-law fraud principles)