Barred Business v. Kemp, 1:24-cv-02744

Plaintiffs, including Barred Business Foundation and individuals affiliated with charitable bail funds, challenge Section 4 of Georgia Senate Bill 63 (2024), which limits cash bail postings and imposes surety requirements on charitable bail organizations.
The Act caps the number of cash bonds that any individual or entity, including groups and charities, can post annually in any jurisdiction and requires those purporting to be charitable bail funds to comply with professional surety company standards.
Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction; the Court granted a TRO and now addresses the preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs assert that the law is unconstitutionally vague, infringes on expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, and imposes content-based restrictions on speech.
Defendants (the State of Georgia and officials) oppose the injunction, arguing the statute is not vague and serves important state interests such as ensuring defendants' court appearances.
The Court ultimately grants a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Section 4 during the litigation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the Bond Limit unconstitutionally vague under due process?	The term "group" and application are unclear, potentially criminalizing a wide range of lawful conduct.	Statute can be read narrowly to only target charitable bail funds, not individuals acting on their own.	Bond Limit is unconstitutionally vague; fails to provide clear notice and invites arbitrary enforcement.
Does the Bond Limit restrict expressive conduct (1st Amendment)?	Charitable bail posting is an act of expressive protest against poverty-based detention.	Posting bail is not inherently expressive conduct subject to 1st Amendment protection.	Posting bail, in this context, is expressive conduct and protected by the 1st Amendment.
Is the Surety Requirement a content-based speech restriction?	Requirement targets entities who make speech regarding charitable bail activities/donations.	State interest in monitoring bail organizations is legitimate; statute regulates conduct, not speech.	Surety Requirement is content-based, fails strict scrutiny, and is unconstitutional.
Do the injunction factors support relief?	Plaintiffs face irreparable harm to constitutional rights; no clear harm to State; public interest supports relief.	No irreparable harm due to timing; State has important interests in ensuring court appearances.	Injunction factors met; preliminary injunction issued.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (defines unconstitutional vagueness and due process standards for precision in criminal statutes)
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (establishes that conduct may be protected by the First Amendment if sufficiently expressive)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and require strict scrutiny)
United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (government's content-based burdens must satisfy strict scrutiny)
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (upholds facial challenges to vague criminal laws that impact fundamental rights)
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (sets standard for government regulation of expressive conduct)
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (symbolic acts as protected speech under the First Amendment)
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (government cannot restrict speech because of its content)
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (recent direction to view religiously-motivated expressive conduct under speech framework)