Barnhardt v. District of Columbia
2010 D.C. App. LEXIS 671
| D.C. | 2010Background
- Barnhardt's property was destroyed by the Metropolitan Police Department; items included currency, jewelry, and other effects.
- He sought return of property and later pursued a federal claim for due process and state-law torts against the District.
- DC § 12-309 requires six-month written notice to the Mayor after injury to maintain an action; notice may be by actual or inquiry knowledge.
- The District treated the six-month period as a notice bar; district court granted summary judgment based on untimely notice.
- The federal appellate court certified whether § 12-309 bars claims when the claimant did not know of the injury within six months.
- This court held that § 12-309 requires knowledge of injury or damage, with a potential inquiry notice, and the six-month clock begins when such knowledge exists.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 12-309 bar tort claims if aware after six months? | Barnhardt asserts no timely notice if unaware of injury within six months. | District contends six-month notice runs from injury regardless of awareness. | No; bar applies only when claimant knew or should have known of injury within six months. |
| What constitutes 'injury' triggering the six-month clock? | Injury may be unknown; discovery rule not applicable in § 12-309 context. | Notice should begin upon injury or the onset of knowledge of injury, even if not fully understood. | Injury means injury of which the claimant is aware; lack of awareness of seriousness does not excuse notice. |
| Does discovery or equitable tolling apply to § 12-309? | Claimant should be excused for delayed knowledge due to discovery or tolling. | Equitable tolling and discovery rules do not apply to § 12-309. | Neither discovery rule nor equitable tolling applies to Section 12-309. |
| When did Barnhardt first become aware of the injury? | Awareness occurred upon discovery or upon notice that items were destroyed. | Awareness could have begun as early as 2007 when notices were filed or when property custody was clarified. | The record is unclear; the six-month period runs from actual or inquiry notice of injury, requiring factual development. |
| Does § 12-309 bar claims if plaintiff never received notice due to government wrongdoing? | If injury was unknown due to concealment, nine cases suggest potential exception. | No general exception; the rule is strict and exceptions are for legislative remedy only. | Court left open the possibility but noted insufficient facts to decide; no broad exception announced. |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356 (D.C.1995) (notice is a mandatory prerequisite, not a statute of limitations)
- Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376 (D.C.1981) (strict interpretation of § 12-309; no tolled or discovery rule excuses)
- Ross v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 14 (D.C.1997) (total lack of awareness vs. awareness with seriousness; triggers six-month clock at discovery)
- Brown v. District of Columbia, 853 A.2d 733 (D.C.2004) (concurrence discusses open questions about awareness and concealment)
- Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803 (D.C.1978) (stated purposes of § 12-309 to protect against unreasonable claims and provide notice)
- D.C. v. Hill, 345 A.2d 867 (D.C.1975) (limitations context and notice principles relevant to § 12-309)