Barnett v. State
300 Ga. 551
Ga.2017Background
- On Sept. 6, 2002, George “Bubba” Bennett was fatally stabbed after Steven Barnett arrived at Bennett’s home, argued with him, and a fight ensued; Bennett died of a chest wound entering the aorta. Officers arrested Barnett shortly after; he was covered in the victim’s blood. A bloodied kitchen knife was found in the front yard.
- No eyewitnesses to the actual stabbing; neighbor and the victim’s former girlfriend testified about Barnett’s arrival, threats, and a prior history of Barnett’s violence and threats toward the former girlfriend. Toxicology and autopsy evidence showed a struggle and drugs in the victim’s system.
- Barnett was tried in Feb. 2004, acquitted of voluntary manslaughter but convicted of malice murder and sentenced to life. Motion for new trial was denied; appeal followed.
- At trial the judge disclosed on the record that decades earlier, while in private practice, she had represented the victim in an unrelated DNR matter; defense waived on the record and made no recusal motion.
- Post-trial, Barnett argued the judge should have recused herself (due process/ethical violation) and that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify (self-defense claim). The trial court and this Court rejected both claims and affirmed the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Barnett) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence | Trial evidence insufficient to prove malice murder beyond reasonable doubt (asserted but not pursued) | Evidence (threats, presence, blood, knife, lack of eyewitness exculpation) supports conviction | Court independently finds evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia and affirms |
| Judicial recusal/disclosure | Judge’s prior representation of victim required recusal; waiver was not informed | Defense waived after on-the-record disclosure; no timely recusal motion; no disqualifying circumstances shown | Waiver and failure to promptly move preserved nothing for appeal; even on merits, prior representation in unrelated matter did not show actual or probable bias; no reversible error |
| Due process / actual bias | Prior representation and later JQC inquiry show judge biased, violating due process | Due process requires actual bias or a constitutionally intolerable probability of bias; mere appearance or prior representation alone insufficient | No evidence of actual bias or intolerable probability of bias; comments/rulings alone insufficient to show bias |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to testify | Counsel unreasonably prevented Barnett from testifying, undermining self-defense claim (Barnett has mental-impairment claim) | Counsel reasonably advised against testifying to avoid damaging cross-examination; strategy to present self-defense through other evidence was legitimate | Counsel’s performance not deficient under Strickland; decision to avoid subjecting client to harmful cross-examination was reasonable; no prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two-part test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (judicial rulings alone seldom constitute bias)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (due process requires recusal only where probability of actual bias is constitutionally intolerable)
- Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742 (Ga. 2016) (prompt motion to recuse required to preserve appellate review)