Barnett v. Happy Cab Co., 945 N.W.2d 200

Barnett sued Happy Cab, Checker Cab, and driver Richard Kincaid for injuries from a cab incident, alleging Kincaid was an employee and liability imputed via respondeat superior.
Days before trial, defendants filed an offer to confess judgment for $75,000 that identified “Happy Cab” and Paratransit Insurance in the text but was signed/"Respectfully submitted" by Happy Cab, Checker Cab, and Kincaid.
Barnett filed an acceptance limited to Happy Cab and Paratransit Insurance only.
The trial court initially held the acceptance bound only Happy Cab and entered judgment against Happy Cab on April 15; defendants moved to alter or amend, arguing the offer was intended to bind all appellees.
On May 9 the trial court granted the motion, entered an amended judgment against all appellees for $75,000, and denied dismissal of Checker Cab and Kincaid; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding no contract was formed for lack of a meeting of the minds and vacating the amended judgment, remanding with directions to vacate the April 15 judgment as well.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the offer to confess judgment applied to all appellees	Barnett: he accepted only as to Happy Cab and Paratransit Insurance; therefore only Happy Cab is bound	Appellees: offer was submitted on behalf of all defendants (signed by all counsel), so it bound Checker Cab and Kincaid too	Held: Offer ambiguous as to which parties made it; Barnett’s limited acceptance varied the offer and operated as a counteroffer; no meeting of the minds, so no contract and no judgment against all appellees
Whether the trial court properly applied the Podraza “intent” rule/rebuttable presumption	Barnett: trial court erred to focus on appellees’ intent alone rather than mutual assent	Appellees: presumption/intent evidence supports that offer bound all clients of counsel	Held: Appellate court found plain error in trial court’s focus; contract formation requires mutual assent, not unilateral intent presumption when acceptance does not mirror offer
Whether the amended order and April 15 order should be vacated due to confusion and inconsistent rulings	Barnett: amended order is confusing and contradicts prior order; both should be vacated to return parties to pre-offer status	Appellees: sought application of offer to all and dismissal of remaining defendants	Held: May 9 amended judgment vacated; court directed reversal and vacatur of April 15 judgment as well, returning parties to their pre-offer positions

Podraza v. New Century Physicians of Neb., 280 Neb. 678 (2010) (discusses intent rule and rebuttable presumption regarding who an offer binds)
Stitch Ranch v. Double B.J. Farms, 21 Neb. App. 328 (2013) (explains meeting of the minds and contract formation may be implied from conduct)
Logan Ranch v. Farm Credit Bank, 238 Neb. 814 (1991) (an acceptance that adds or varies terms is a counteroffer)
Palmer v. Stiles, 78 Neb. 362 (1907) (articulates confessed-judgment statute’s purpose to encourage compromise)
Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131 (2012) (appellate courts may notice plain error)
United States Cold Storage v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 579 (2013) (defines plain error standard)
Breci v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 288 Neb. 626 (2014) (motion to alter or amend reviewed for abuse of discretion)