Barnett v. Cleghorn
2017 Ark. App. 641
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- On Aug. 17, 2011, Morgan Barnett stopped in eastbound traffic on Hwy. 270 to make a left turn; Damon Cleghorn (driving a Purcell truck) passed her on the right shoulder and did not strike her vehicle. Dustin Golden, driving behind Cleghorn, struck the rear of Barnett’s car and then hit Cleghorn’s truck, producing a multi-vehicle collision and injuries.
- Plaintiffs (Morgan and her parents) sued Cleghorn and Purcell Tire under negligence and respondeat superior, alleging Cleghorn’s illegal/right-shoulder pass and inattentive or excessive driving proximately caused the chain-reaction crash.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting an accident-reconstruction affidavit (R. Torrey Roberts) concluding Golden had 3.2–5.5 seconds to see Cleghorn slow and pass and could have avoided the collision; Roberts relied on Cleghorn’s varying statements about whether he stopped before passing.
- Plaintiffs submitted a sur-reply with a preliminary report from their reconstructionist (Chuck Atkinson) opining Golden’s stopping distance exceeded available sight/stopping distance (total stopping distance 275 ft) and that Cleghorn’s maneuver deprived Golden of adequate time to react; neither expert report was sworn, and plaintiffs argued discovery was incomplete.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment to defendants; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding genuine issues of material fact exist on proximate causation and whether Golden’s conduct was an independent intervening cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cleghorn’s conduct was a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries | Cleghorn’s evasive pass and possible failure to stop created the dangerous situation and obscured Barnett from Golden, causing the collisions | Cleghorn didn’t hit Barnett; reconstruction shows Golden had sufficient time (3.2–5.5 sec) to react, so Cleghorn was not a proximate cause | Reversed: factual dispute exists on causation; proximate cause for jury due to conflicting expert opinions |
| Whether Golden’s negligence (if any) was an independent, superseding cause | Even if Golden was negligent, his response was a normal reaction to a situation Cleghorn created, not a superseding independent cause | Golden’s failure to react absolves Cleghorn because Golden had adequate notice to avoid collision | Reversed: question whether Golden’s act was superseding or a normal response is fact issue for jury |
| Admissibility/timeliness of plaintiffs’ expert evidence submitted in a sur-reply | Plaintiffs argued discovery ongoing and that their expert’s preliminary findings raised factual disputes; court considered the sur-reply | Defendants moved to strike the sur-reply and argued untimeliness and unsworn reports | Court of Appeals noted the reports were unsworn but not challenged below and that the trial court considered them; denied motion to strike and found material fact issues |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment given conflicting expert opinion | Plaintiffs: conflicting expert analyses create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment | Defendants: their reconstructionist established Golden had sufficient reaction time, entitling them to judgment as a matter of law | Court of Appeals: summary judgment improper where conflicting expert proof requires weighing credibility at trial; reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 431 S.W.3d 321 (Ark. Ct. App.) (standard for summary judgment and burden on nonmoving party)
- Pollard v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 54 S.W.3d 559 (Ark. Ct. App.) (proximate cause generally a jury question; intervening cause doctrine)
- Shannon v. Wilson, 947 S.W.2d 349 (Ark.) (intervening cause must be independent to supersede original negligence)
- Hill v. Wilson, 224 S.W.2d 797 (Ark.) (normal response to a created peril is not a superseding cause)
- Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 284 S.W.3d 29 (Ark.) (summary judgment not for assessing probative strength of conflicting expert opinions)
- Hadder v. Heritage Hill Manor, Inc., 495 S.W.3d 628 (Ark. Ct. App.) (evidence in summary-judgment proceedings must be under oath)
- Thompson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 467 S.W.3d 746 (Ark. Ct. App.) (failure to challenge procedural defects below may waive objection on appeal)