Barnes v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD.
2011 WL 2836269
D. Maryland2011Background
- Barnes alleges Lagos arrested him after a reported fight on June 17, 2008; Lagos observed a fight and arrested Barnes for second degree assault, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest, with Wyzga present; Barnes was tasered by Moss and detained, later acquitted on disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, with the second-degree assault charge dismissed pre-trial.
- Barnes sues Montgomery County and officers, asserting §1983 claims (Fourth/Fifth Amendments), Maryland torts (assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution), and Maryland Declaration of Rights claims; defendants move for partial dismissal and later for summary judgment on Count VIII (Abuse of Process).
- The court grants summary judgment for Lagos on Count VIII (abuse of process) and for Montgomery County on Count VIII due to governmental immunity; the cross-motions proceed on Barnes’ common law and §1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and related battery and Maryland Declaration of Rights claims; genuine disputes of material fact remain as to probable cause for various arrests.
- The court analyzes abuse of process elements (ulterior motive plus willful act outside regular process) and finds no post-issuance abuse; it also finds governmental immunity bars the county’s liability for abuse of process; for false arrest/imprisonment/malicious prosecution the court finds genuine disputes over probable cause and declines to grant summary judgment; excessive force arising from an unlawful arrest is not pursued under Article 24 but under Article 26/4th Amendment framework; the battery claim is likewise deferred to trial.
- The final disposition leaves several counts for trial: counts I (false arrest/malicious prosecution under §1983) and III (malicious prosecution) against Lagos and Wyzga, count II (excessive force) against Moss, counts IV and V (false imprisonment/arrest) against Wyzga and Lagos, count VI (battery) against Moss, and count VII (Maryland Declaration rights violations) against Wyzga and Lagos.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abuse of process by Lagos | Lagos misused process due to numerous prior calls. | Abuse requires post-issuance improper use; Lagos arrest tied to protecting the community. | Granted; Lagos entitled to summary judgment on abuse of process. |
| County liability for abuse of process | Montgomery County liable for abuse of process (Monell-like). | County immune for governmental functions. | Granted; County immune; Count VIII dismissed. |
| Probable cause for false arrest (disorderly conduct/second degree assault) | Officers lacked probable cause; crowd testimony disputed. | There was observed conduct supporting arrest; disputed facts preclude summary judgment. | Denied; genuine disputes preclude summary judgment on these false arrest claims. |
| False arrest/imprisonment and malicious prosecution under §1983 | Claims should be resolved in plaintiff’s favor given lack of probable cause. | Genuine factual disputes remain on probable cause; not warranted for summary judgment. | Denied; issues remain for trial. |
| Excessive force and Maryland Article 24 claim | Taser use during unlawful arrest constitutes excessive force under Article 24. | Excessive force analyzed under Fourth Amendment; Article 24 not applicable here. | Dismissed as to Article 24; remaining Fourth Amendment analysis governed by §1983. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cottman v. Cottman, 56 Md. App. 413, 468 A.2d 131 (Md. 1983) (abuse of process requires perversion of process after issuance; ulterior motive alone insufficient)
- Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 904 A.2d 557 (Md. 2006) (abuse of process involves use of process for improper end, beyond regular conduct of proceeding)
- Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 771 A.2d 389 (Md. 2001) (probable cause evaluation is objective for police actions)
- Hardesty v. Hamburg Tp., 461 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2006) (police officers not in privity with prosecution; collateral estoppel not applicable to preclude defense)