Barnaby, Kemos Marque, WR-80,099-01

In 2009 Barnaby was arrested after officers found a small plastic bag containing suspected crack; DPS analyst Jonathan Salvador reported the substance contained cocaine and certified the result.
Barnaby pled guilty in a package deal to four possession-with-intent-to-deliver charges (all enhanced by priors) and received four concurrent 50-year sentences.
Salvador was later discovered to have engaged in dry-labbing and other lab misconduct; DPS investigations, an Inspector General report, and retesting cast doubt on his reports.
Under Ex parte Coty, the Court adopted a five-part protocol to infer falsity when a lab technician shows a pattern of misconduct; if established the burden shifts to the State to rebut.
Barnaby invoked Coty to infer that Salvador’s report in his case was false; the State conceded falsity. The remaining question was whether that falsity was material to Barnaby’s guilty plea (i.e., whether he would have insisted on trial had he known).
The habeas court found Barnaby proved falsity and initially recommended relief; after reviewing dash-cam evidence and plea benefits (including dismissal/waiver of drug-free-zone findings in related cases), the Court ultimately held the falsity was not material and denied relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Salvador’s misconduct allows an inference that the lab report in Barnaby’s case was false	Salvador’s pattern of dry-labbing + he handled Barnaby’s sample → inference of falsity under Coty	State conceded applicant met Coty factors but bore burden to rebut; offered no contrary evidence	Court found Coty factors met, State offered no rebuttal, and inferred the lab report was false
Standard for materiality of false evidence in guilty-plea context	Materiality should be measured by whether the false evidence affected Barnaby’s decision to plead guilty (i.e., "but for" knowledge he would have gone to trial)	Agreed with plaintiff’s proposed standard (akin to Hill/Strickland prejudice in plea cases)	Court adopted the "but for"/would-have-insisted-on-trial standard for plea cases
Whether Salvador’s false report was material to voluntariness of Barnaby’s guilty plea	Barnaby would not have pled guilty had he known the report was false	State argued plea benefits (resolution of three other cases, waiver of drug-free-zone findings affecting parole eligibility, risk of consecutive sentences) outweighed value of the challenged report	Court held, by preponderance, the plea benefits outweighed the falsity; Barnaby would not have insisted on trial, so falsity was not material; relief denied

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (plea waives multiple constitutional rights and must be voluntary)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (Strickland prejudice standard adapted for guilty pleas)
Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (protocol to infer falsity from a lab technician's pattern of misconduct)
Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (materiality standard for false testimony at trial)
Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (application of Hill/Strickland framework to guilty-plea ineffective-assistance claims)