343 Conn. 347
Conn.2022Background
- In 1997 Barlow was charged with attempt to commit murder and related offenses; the trial court offered a plea of 15 years, execution suspended after 9 (9 years to serve), and the state offered 18/14; Barlow sought about 6 years and rejected the court offer.
- At trial the state introduced strong inculpatory evidence (witness statements, ballistics linking shell casings to a gun in Barlow’s car, inculpatory statements by codefendants), and Barlow was convicted and sentenced to 35 years.
- Barlow filed multiple habeas petitions alleging his trial counsel (Moore) provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him about the court’s 9‑year offer during plea negotiations.
- The Appellate Court previously held counsel’s performance was deficient and remanded to determine prejudice; on remand a second habeas trial (before a different judge) credited expert testimony and Barlow’s testimony and found a reasonable probability he would have accepted the 9‑year offer if properly advised.
- The habeas court granted relief; the Commissioner appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which affirmed the habeas court’s finding that Barlow satisfied Strickland prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barlow proved prejudice under Strickland (that he would have accepted the 9‑year plea) | Barlow: credible testimony + strong contemporaneous evidence (generous offer vs. 35 years, willingness to plead, small gap between 6 and 9 years, strength of state’s case) show reasonable probability he would have accepted | Commissioner: habeas court improperly relied on Appellate Court’s deficiency holding and on post‑hoc testimony; contemporaneous evidence shows Barlow could decide for himself | Court: affirmed — habeas court’s factual finding that Barlow likely would have accepted the 9‑year plea is supported and not clearly erroneous |
| Whether the Appellate Court’s prior determination that counsel’s performance was deficient remained final | Barlow: Appellate Court’s decision was final on the deficiency issue and not relitigable because no certification was sought | Commissioner: argued the deficiency determination was not finally resolved and should be revisited | Court: Appellate Court’s decision was a final determination of the legal issue; respondent may not relitigate it |
| Whether Lee v. United States requires contemporaneous evidence for rejected plea offers | Barlow: Lee’s admonition targets accepted pleas; in any event contemporaneous evidence here is sufficient | Commissioner: Lee requires contemporaneous evidence to substantiate post‑hoc claims and such evidence predominates against Barlow | Court: avoided deciding Lee’s full scope but held the record contained sufficient contemporaneous evidence to corroborate Barlow’s testimony |
| Whether the habeas court’s credibility and factual findings were clearly erroneous | Barlow: habeas court heard witnesses, credited petitioner and expert, and weighed contemporaneous evidence appropriately | Commissioner: conflicting contemporaneous evidence (intelligence, prior plea behavior, risk taking, access to statements) undermines petitioner’s claims | Court: gave deference to the habeas factfinder and concluded findings were supported and not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (prejudice standard when counsel’s ineffectiveness leads to loss of a plea offer)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (remedies and prejudice analysis when counsel’s errors affect plea bargaining)
- Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (admonition to seek contemporaneous evidence to substantiate post‑hoc claims about plea choices)
- Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn. 342 (2012) (Connecticut application of prejudice inquiry in the plea context)
- Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 338 Conn. 330 (2021) (plea bargaining is a critical stage; counsel has duties in plea negotiations)
