Barksdale v. Wilkowsky
20 A.3d 765
| Md. | 2011Background
- Barksdale sued the property owners for injuries from lead paint at her childhood home (2440 West Baltimore Street) based on exposure during residence.
- During trial, Owners elicited testimony about grandmother’s failure to report flaking paint and sought a jury instruction tying tenant duties to landlord liability under Baltimore City Housing Code §902A.
- Trial court gave a §902A instruction, which suggested a tenant’s failure to report chipping paint could be evidence of negligence by the landlord, despite grandmother’s actions not imputable to Barksdale and Barksdale being too young to bear such a duty.
- Court of Special Appeals affirmed the verdict but held the instruction was erroneous but harmless, applying a standard harmless-error review.
- Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to reassess the harmless-error standard in civil cases involving erroneous jury instructions, focusing on whether prejudice was shown and whether the error was reversible.
- The Court held the erroneous instruction was not harmless error and reversed the CS Appeals judgment, remanding for a new trial with costs to respondents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the CSP correctly interpreted harmless error for a substantive jury instruction | Barksdale argues CSP misapplied harm standard and should reverse. | Owners contend the error was harmless given jury focus on landlord duties. | Prejudicial error; CSP misapplied; reversal warranted. |
| Whether the harmless-error interpretation is appropriate for a statutorily protected class like lead-poisoned children | Leaves presumption of prejudice due to class characteristics. | No special presumption for protected class should apply. | No presumption for protected class; but prejudice shown on record. |
| Whether the harmless-error standard’s interpretation and application are constitutional | Argues potential violates due process/trial rights by misallocating fault. | No constitutional violation from the application of harmless-error standards. | Constitutional concerns not sustained to defeat reversal; error prejudicial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27 (Md. 2007) (harmless error with emphasis on prejudice and overall record)
- Greenbriar v. Brooks, 387 Md. 683 (Md. 2005) (standard of harmless error in civil cases; balancing prejudice)
- Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83 (Md. 2004) (prejudice must be substantial; focus on probability of prejudice)
- Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321 (Md. 1977) (prejudice standard in civil contexts; requirement of prejudice showing)
- Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 341 (Md. 2003) (prejudice from misleading or distracting instructions; no automatic standard)
- National Medical Transp. Network v. Deloitte & Touche, 62 Cal. App. 4th 412 (Cal. App. 4th 1998) (four-factor approach to prejudicial instruction; non-exclusive framework)
- LNC Invs. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 173 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1999) (prejudice when erroneous liability standard affects core issue)
- Nat'l Med. Transp. Network v. Deloitte & Touche, 62 Cal. App. 4th 412 (Cal. App. 4th 1998) (objective factors for prejudicial error in jury instructions)