Barking Hound Village, LLC v. Monyak
299 Ga. 144
| Ga. | 2016Background
- Lola, an 8½-year-old mixed-breed dachshund owned by Robert and Elizabeth Monyak, was boarded at Barking Hound Village (BHV) and allegedly given a toxic dose of another dog’s medication, leading to acute renal failure and death nine months later.
- The Monyaks incurred substantial veterinary expenses (over $67,000 asserted) attempting to save Lola and sued BHV and its manager Furman for negligence, fraud, and punitive damages.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing damages are capped at the dog’s fair market value and that Lola had no market value, which would bar recovery; they also sought partial summary judgment on fraud and punitive damages.
- The trial court allowed owners to present evidence of the dog’s actual value to them (including veterinary expenses and non-economic factors) and denied defendants’ summary judgment except as to fraud/punitive claims; the Court of Appeals rejected market-value cap and disallowed sentimental-value recovery.
- The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether damages are measured by an owner-specific actual value or by fair market value, and whether veterinary expenses are recoverable in addition to market value.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Monyak) | Defendant's Argument (BHV/Furman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper measure of damages for negligent killing of a pet | Owner’s "actual value" standard; market cap is unfair and inadequate | Fair market value caps total recovery; if market value is nominal, recovery fails | Damages governed by fair market value + interest, plus reasonable veterinary/other expenses; owner-specific sentimental value not recoverable |
| Recoverability of veterinary and treatment expenses after death | Veterinary costs incurred trying to save pet are recoverable even if animal later dies | Veterinary/treatment expenses should be limited by pre-injury market value | Veterinary and other reasonable expenses are recoverable in addition to market value; not capped by market value |
| Admissibility of non-economic/sentimental evidence | Non-economic factors may show reasonableness of incurring expenses and context for value | Sentimental/intrinsic value should not be compensable; defendants opposed owner-only value evidence | Sentimental value is not compensable; descriptive qualitative/quantitative evidence (breed, age, training, condition) admissible to establish fair market value and reasonableness of expenses |
| Burden/means of proving market value when market is nominal | Owners may prove market value via attributes, witnesses, and circumstantial evidence | If no public market, recovery should be limited or denied | Fair market value is for the factfinder; juries may consider breed, age, purchase/replacement, use, veterinary records, etc., to determine market value even when nominal |
Key Cases Cited
- Telfair County v. Webb, 119 Ga. 916 (1904) (establishes animal-death damages include market value plus recoverable treatment expenses)
- Atlanta Cotton-Seed Oil Mills v. Coffey, 80 Ga. 145 (1887) (recognizes full market value for destroyed animal plus medical and care expenses)
- MCI Communications Svcs. v. CMES, Inc., 291 Ga. 461 (2012) (general rule that damages for personal property are capped at pre-injury fair market value, distinguished here from animal-injury precedent)
- Cherry v. McCutchen, 65 Ga. App. 301 (1941) (discussed in Court of Appeals opinion on "actual value to owner" principle, but Georgia Supreme Court rejects sentimental-value recovery)
- Columbus R. R. Co. v. Woolfolk, 128 Ga. 631 (1907) (recognizes dogs as personal property and admissibility of evidence to prove value)
- Southern Ry. Co. v. Stearnes, 8 Ga. App. 111 (1910) (addressed in history of animal-damage jurisprudence; language limiting recovery treated as dicta and inconsistent with Webb and Coffey)
- Chalker v. Raley, 73 Ga. App. 415 (1946) (permits qualitative evidence of an animal’s attributes as relevant to value)