218 Cal. App. 4th 1449
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- Plaintiff Abigail Barker sued under the Drug Dealer Liability Act (DDLA) after her brother Matthew died from an overdose on June 10, 2008; Barker was a minor at that time and reached majority in April 2010.
- Allegation: registered psychiatric nurse Cari Garza illegally furnished Matthew fentanyl (and possibly Klonopin) during a psychiatric relapse, and Matthew died as a result.
- Plaintiffs filed an initial complaint on June 10, 2010 (two years after death); DDLA claims were first asserted in the first amended complaint on February 9, 2011, and maintained in the second amended complaint (SAC).
- Garza demurred to the SAC, arguing the DDLA claim was time-barred by the DDLA’s one-year limitations period (Health & Saf. Code § 11714(a)).
- Barker argued (1) minority tolling under Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a) made her DDLA claim timely, and (2) § 11714(b) tolled the DDLA limitations period until one year after a defendant’s criminal conviction; the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: it held § 352(a) does not toll DDLA claims and (alternatively) Barker waived the § 11714(b) argument and, in any event, § 11714(b) did not apply because Garza was never convicted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether minority tolling (§ 352(a)) applies to DDLA claims | Barker: § 352(a) tolls the one-year DDLA period because DDLA is an action upon a statute (so it is “mentioned” in chapter 3) | Garza: DDLA contains its own specific limitations/tolling scheme; § 352(a) does not apply | Held: § 352(a) does not toll DDLA claims. The DDLA’s specific one-year rule and its narrow tolling exception in § 11714(b) exclude minority tolling |
| Whether § 11714(b) tolls the statute until one year after a defendant’s drug conviction (making Barker timely) | Barker: § 11714(b) tolled the limitations period during any time the defendant could be prosecuted, so her claim was timely | Garza: § 11714(b) applies only if defendant is convicted; no conviction here; argument not preserved below | Held: Barker waived the argument below; on the merits § 11714(b) in any event does not apply because Garza was not convicted |
| Proper interpretive approach to statutory tolling/exclusions | Barker: general tolling (e.g., § 352) should apply unless statute clearly excludes it | Garza: specific DDLA language (“Except as otherwise provided in this section...”) and legislative design show the Legislature intended only the narrow tolling exception in § 11714(b) | Held: Court applies rules of statutory construction—specific statutory limitation governs; express narrow exception in § 11714(b) evidences legislative intent to exclude other tolling, including minority tolling |
| Whether equitable tolling/evidentiary arguments preserve claim | Barker: (raised in footnote) equitable tolling might preserve her claim | Garza: demurrer challenged timeliness; equitable tolling not pleaded or raised below | Held: Barker waived equitable tolling (not raised below) and further forfeited by presenting it only in a footnote on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Whittemore v. Owens Healthcare-Retail Pharmacy, Inc., 185 Cal.App.4th 1194 (review standard treating demurrer as admitting well-pleaded facts)
- Williams v. Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth., 68 Cal.2d 599 (Cal. 1968) (historic rule that minority tolling under § 352(a) protects claims “mentioned” in chapter 3)
- Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. Cal. Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (Cal. 2005) (statutory interpretation principles—ascertain legislative intent from text)
- Vafi v. McCloskey, 193 Cal.App.4th 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (specific statute of limitations controls over general ones)
- McGee v. Weinberg, 97 Cal.App.3d 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (demurrer may be sustained when complaint shows on its face that claim is time-barred)
- Bledstein v. Superior Court, 162 Cal.App.3d 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (distinguishing tolling where statute contains explicit limiting language)
- Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383 (Cal. 1999) (courts may not judicially add exceptions to a statutory scheme)
- Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479 (Cal. 1996) (policy rationales for statutes of limitations)