477 S.W.3d 583
Ky.2015Background
- Defendant Adam Anthony Barker returned to Scarpellini’s apartment at night carrying a knife and a loaded gun and slashed what he believed were Scarpellini’s tires; a subsequent confrontation ended with Barker shooting and killing Zachary Scarpellini.
- At retrial (after this Court reversed an earlier conviction), the jury convicted Barker of second-degree manslaughter; the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence to run consecutively to earlier tampering-related sentences, yielding an effective 20-year term.
- Key factual dispute at trial: Barker claimed he acted in self-defense, asserting Scarpellini drew a gun and attacked; eyewitness Shawn Reilly testified Scarpellini never drew his gun and Barker fired immediately.
- The trial court instructed the jury on self-protection but included a provocation qualification (excluding self-defense when defendant intended to cause death or serious injury and provoked the victim), and used a manslaughter instruction that framed wantonness in a way the Court later described as confusing.
- The Commonwealth cross-appealed, challenging the trial court’s jury-selection procedures under this Court’s Oro-Jimenez guidance; the Commonwealth also sought unconventional certification-of-law relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Barker) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provocation qualification to self-protection instruction | Instruction appropriate because Barker admitted he wanted to "piss off" the victim, which the jury could infer amounted to provoking or inviting confrontation | No evidence supported provocation or intent to cause death/serious injury; vandalism done covertly with no encounter does not support provocation instruction | Reversed: provocation qualification was not supported by the evidence and its inclusion was not harmless; conviction reversed |
| Jury-selection methodology (Oro-Jimenez compliance) | Trial court deviated from Oro-Jimenez in seating venire, sequential replacement of alternates, and the use of a catchall question for replacements | Trial court procedure did not cause prejudice and was within discretion | Commonwealth's cross-appeal rejected on the merits: deviations were not substantial and no prejudice shown |
| Second-degree manslaughter instruction phrasing (conflicting mental states) | (argued on appeal) Instruction properly stated elements including wantonness | Instruction erroneously required wantonness tied to defendant's belief about need for force, creating confusion between theories | Court found the instruction problematic (likely confusing jurors by mixing theories); issue unpreserved but gave model language for retrial |
| Commonwealth's attempt to convert cross-appeal into certification of law | Sought advisory guidance under Ky. Const. §115 via cross-appeal | Barker opposed treating cross-appeal as certification | Court rejected treating the Commonwealth's cross-appeal as a certification request and declined to issue advisory relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 112 (Ky. 2011) (prior appeal recounting facts and addressing related instructional issues)
- Oro-Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.3d 174 (Ky. 2013) (jury-selection guidelines referenced by Commonwealth)
- Stepp v. Commonwealth, 608 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1980) (self-protection qualifications and availability of the defense)
- Saylor v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812 (Ky. 2004) (two recognized theories of second-degree manslaughter)
- Hager v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 828 (Ky. 2001) (model instruction on second-degree manslaughter and imperfect self-defense)
- Robertson v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1980) (concerns about sequential replacement enabling manipulation of the jury pool)
- Smith v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1982) (example where cross-appeal was construed as request for certification of law)