Bardzik v. County of Orange, 635 F.3d 1138

Bardzik was a lieutenant and Reserve Division Commander, a prestigious post supervising ~600 reserve officers, reporting in practice to department leadership but with visible interaction with the Sheriff early on.
Carona selected Bardzik for Reserve Division Commander to clean up the division, emphasizing ethical leadership and eliminating favoritism.
Bardzik implemented programs and audits, decentralized the reserves, and promoted a reforms agenda within the Reserve Division.
In 2005 Bardzik openly supported Sheriff opponent Bill Hunt; after discovery, Bardzik was transferred in fall 2005 to Court Operations, a less prestigious, dead-end assignment.
At Court Operations Bardzik faced lower pay prospects, a reduced 2005 evaluation, and denial of opportunities (e.g., Chief of Police interviews), with ongoing internal investigations later dismissed.
Bardzik brought § 1983 claims alleging First Amendment retaliation for political support; district court denied summary judgment on the policy-maker issue and Bardzik’s immunity status, which Carona appeals.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Bardzik a policymaker as Reserve Division Commander?	Bardzik had broad authority over reserve programs and influence over department policy.	Reserve Division Commander is not automatically a policymaker; duties are limited and controlled.	Policymaker for purposes of qualified immunity when Reserve Division Commander.
If Bardzik was a policymaker, does Elrod-Branti shield retaliation against him?	Retaliation for political activity violates First Amendment, not protected by immunity.	Policymaker may be dismissed for political reasons under Elrod-Branti.	No First Amendment violation shielded by immunity for the time Bardzik was policymaker.
Was Bardzik still a policymaker after transfer to Court Operations?	Bardzik remained influential and policymaking across the department.	Court Operations is a nonpolicymaking role; immunity should apply only for earlier period.	Bardzik was not a policymaker at Court Operations; immunity does not apply to later actions.

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1976) (policymaker exception framework for patronage dismissal)
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (U.S. 1980) (policymaker exception details for political loyalty)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (two-step qualified immunity framework (assert violation, then clearly established))
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (modifies two-step approach; may address clearly established prong first)
Fazio v. City of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997) (policymaker analysis; Pickering balance considerations when policymaker)
DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2000) (deputy sheriffs not per se policymakers; context matters)
Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1989) (training/evaluation of subordinates not necessarily policymaking)
Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) (reciprocal standard for reviewing district court factual determinations in § 1983 cases)
Branti, Elrod, Moran v. Washington, see Branti and Elrod above; Moran referenced (various) (policy and corruption considerations in policymaker/advocacy)