Bardsley v. Pluger, 358 P.3d 907

Scott Bardsley and Dora Cichantek (Plaintiffs) live on a parcel accessed historically via Pluger Way, a private road crossing property titled to Edwin Pluger; neighboring occupants are Lizann and Earnest (Defendants).
August 21, 2012: court issued a permanent order of protection in favor of Lizann against Scott (not appealed); it prohibited Scott from using Pluger Way.
Plaintiffs sued Lizann and Earnest (December 2012) alleging an express easement over Pluger Way, seeking damages and an injunction; the complaint attached the deed showing Edwin as title owner but did not name him as a defendant.
After a February 5, 2013 preliminary-injunction hearing, the court denied injunctive relief and on February 6 sua sponte amended the earlier protection order to bar Dora (and her family) from using Pluger Way.
Defendants moved for summary judgment (June 2013) arguing the real owner was not named; Plaintiffs waited until May 2014 to move to amend their complaint to add Edwin and assert easement-by-prescription/necessity theories.
District Court (Oct. 2014) denied leave to amend, granted summary judgment to Defendants, and awarded attorney’s fees; Plaintiffs appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the February 6, 2013 amended protection order but affirmed the denial of leave to amend, summary judgment, and attorney’s fees.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Was the sua sponte amendment of the protection order an abuse of discretion?	The court expanded protection to include Dora without affording her opportunity to be heard (due process violation).	The Feb. 5 hearing satisfied process.	Court abused discretion; vacated the Feb. 6, 2013 amended order because no statutorily required show-cause hearing for Dora occurred.
2. Was denial of leave to amend pleadings an abuse of discretion?	Plaintiffs argued amendment should be allowed; Defendants suffered no prejudice.	Defendants argued Plaintiffs delayed, failed to name true owner, and amendment after summary-judgment motion would prejudice them.	Denial affirmed: undue delay, no adequate justification, and prejudice supported denial.
3. Was summary judgment erroneous?	Plaintiffs contended their proposed amended complaint cured defects (easement by prescription/necessity).	Defendants: without naming title owner or properly pled easement, no genuine issue of material fact.	Affirmed: without the amendment, original complaint lacked a viable easement claim; summary judgment proper.
4. Was the award of attorney’s fees an abuse of discretion?	Plaintiffs claimed amended complaint would have cured defects and fees were unwarranted.	Defendants argued the original suit advanced meritless theories and fees are equitable to make them whole.	Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion in awarding fees under equitable exception to American Rule.

Lockhead v. Lockhead, 314 P.3d 915 (Mont. 2013) (abuse-of-discretion standard for orders of protection)
Kershaw v. Mont. Dept. of Transp., 257 P.3d 358 (Mont. 2011) (standard for reviewing denial of leave to amend)
Town & Country Foods, Inc. v. City of Bozeman, 203 P.3d 1283 (Mont. 2009) (summary judgment standard)
Keller v. Trull, 158 P.3d 439 (Mont. 2007) (statutory right to show-cause hearing before permanent order of protection)
In re Marriage of Coogler, 90 P.3d 414 (Mont. 2004) (issuing permanent protection order without statutorily required hearing is manifest abuse)
Peuse v. Malkuch, 911 P.2d 1153 (Mont. 1996) (delay in changing legal theories after a summary-judgment motion is prejudicial; amendments after such motions allowed only in extraordinary cases)
Erker v. Kester, 988 P.2d 1221 (Mont. 1999) (American Rule on attorney’s fees and equitable exception)
Motta v. Granite County Commissioners, 304 P.3d 72 (Mont. 2013) (equitable exception applies where prevailing party was drawn into meritless or frivolous action)