Barclay v. Briscoe
427 Md. 270
| Md. | 2012Background
- Barclay and wife sued Ports America Baltimore, STA, and ILA for injuries from a head-on crash caused by Richardson, a longshoreman employed by Ports.
- Richardson fell asleep while driving his personal vehicle home after a 22-hour shift at the Port of Baltimore; the collision occurred on a public road, not on employer premises.
- Ports argued no vicarious liability because Richardson was not acting within the scope of employment during the commute and no primary duty to public to prevent fatigue-related driving.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for Ports and the STA, rejecting the special mission and going-and-coming exceptions and any duty to the public.
- Court of Special Appeals affirmed; Maryland Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine vicarious liability, duty, and the potential special-relations theory.
- Maryland precedent (Dhanraj and Oaks) holds that, absent special circumstances, an employer is not vicariously liable for an employee’s vehicular tort committed during the commute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper given disputes of material fact | Barclay contends facts show employer control or special relation; material issues remain. | Ports argues no control or consent over Richardson’s use of his car; no duty to public; no special relation. | Yes; no genuine material-fact dispute affecting res ipsa liability; judgment affirmed. |
| Whether an employer can be vicariously liable under the special circumstances exception for fatigue during commute | Special circumstances exist because fatigue arose from extended shifts and related to employment. | There is no special relation; commute is outside scope; no control over driving. | No; no special relationship exists under Restatement §317 and Maryland precedent; no vicarious liability. |
| Whether employer owes a duty to the motoring public to prevent fatigue-related harms from employees commuting | Foreseeability of harm from fatigued driving imposes a duty to public safety. | Foreseeability does not equal duty; no special relationship; policy favors legislative resolution. | No; duty to third parties does not arise absent a special relationship under Maryland law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (Md. 1982) (outs in-scope-of-employment standard for vicarious liability)
- Dhanraj v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 305 Md. 623, 506 A.2d 224 (Md. 1986) (personal auto use requires express/implied consent or control; commuting generally outside scope)
- Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (Md. 1995) (driving to work not within scope absent employer control or vital business purpose)
- Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (Md. 1986) (foreseeability not tantamount to duty; special-relations requirement for duty)
- Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (Md. 1985) (Restatement §315 duty requires a special relation to exist)
- Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, Inc., 70 Md.App. 244, 520 A.2d 1115 (Md. Ct. App. 1987) (no special relation where employee intoxicated off-premises; limits on employer liability)
- Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. 2009) (afirmative post-incapacity control required to impose duty; predictive of MD approach)
- Faverty v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Oregon, Inc., 133 Or. App. 514, 892 P.2d 703 (Or. App. 1995) (commentary on duty to control fatigued employees; distinguished in MD history)