Barber v. Subway
131 F. Supp. 3d 321
M.D. Penn.2015Background
- Barber, a former Subway employee, sues for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the ADA and PHRA.
- Barber disclosed anxiety and social phobia, submitted medical documentation, and requested accommodations.
- June 12, 2012: Barber suffered an anxiety attack; Patel allegedly ordered her to leave, or otherwise terminated her, depending on account.
- Subway contends Barber was accommodated and left voluntarily, intending to return; Barber contends she was terminated.
- Barber did not return to work or communicate with Subway after the incident; factual disputes exist about whether termination occurred.
- Court denies Subway’s summary judgment motion, finds material factual disputes precluding judgment on all ADA and PHRA claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barber suffered an adverse employment action. | Barber's termination implied by Patel's order to leave. | Patel accommodated and allowed early departure; Barber abandoned her position. | Disputed—genuine issues of material fact exist; not entitled to summary judgment. |
| Whether Subway failed to accommodate Barber’s disability. | Barber requested a break and immediate accommodation following a/anxiety attack. | Barber was accommodated; no failure to accommodate occurred. | Disputed—fact questions remain about adequacy and timing of accommodation. |
| Whether Barber’s retaliation claim is viable. | Retaliation existed for requesting an accommodation. | No adverse action linked to protected activity. | Disputed—record supports possible causal link; summary judgment denied. |
| Whether PHRA claims are properly analyzed under ADA standards. | PHRA claims should follow ADA analysis. | PHRA analysis mirrors ADA; ADA standard applies. | PHRA claims survive to the extent ADA claims do. |
Key Cases Cited
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (U.S. 1989) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination cases; evidence standards rely on mixed-motive/direct theories)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes prima facie case and burden-shifting framework)
- Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2010) (applies burden-shifting framework to ADA/PHRA claims in Third Circuit)
- Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2003) (protects retaliation claims and standards for protected activity)
- Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008) (protects protected activity and retaliation under ADA/PHRA)
- Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996) (permits ADA claims to align with federal standards; PHRA alignment)
- Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n, 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999) (treatment of disability discrimination with broad coverage; guidance for admissible evidence)