154 F. Supp. 3d 954
C.D. Cal.2015Background
- Plaintiffs (Barber, the Malones, Rodriguez) purchased Fancy Feast cat food and allege Nestlé uses seafood in some varieties that was sourced via Thai supply chains where some small fishing vessels use forced labor.
- Plaintiffs claim Nestlé failed to disclose at point of sale the likelihood that some seafood in Fancy Feast was produced with forced labor and bring claims under California UCL, CLRA, and FAL; they seek class certification.
- Nestlé moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The company points to its supplier codes, responsible sourcing guidelines, and website statements about human-rights practices and to the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43).
- The central legal dispute is whether California’s Supply Chains Act creates a “safe harbor” that precludes consumer-protection claims demanding additional point-of-sale disclosures beyond the Act’s mandated website disclosures.
- The court found the Act and its legislative history show the Legislature considered disclosure rules for forced labor and chose limited website disclosures, and concluded plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the safe harbor doctrine.
- The court also addressed, but rejected, plaintiffs’ alternative theory that certain Nestlé statements are actionable misrepresentations, finding those statements aspirational or contextual and thus not independently actionable beyond the safe harbor ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California’s Supply Chains Act bars UCL/CLRA/FAL claims seeking additional point-of-sale disclosures about forced labor | Plaintiffs: § 1714.43 does not authorize nondisclosure at point of sale; absence of an explicit permission means no safe harbor | Nestlé: Legislature considered disclosures for forced-labor risks and limited required disclosures to website; that constitutes a statutory safe harbor | Court: Safe-harbor applies; Legislature considered the issue and prescribed limited disclosures, so consumer-protection claims are barred |
| Whether Nestlé’s website/supplier statements are actionable misrepresentations | Plaintiffs: Statements create impression that supply chain is free of forced labor or that Nestlé verifies absence of forced labor | Nestlé: Statements are aspirational/descrptive of policies, acknowledge noncompliance may exist and describe efforts to remedy it | Court: Statements are contextual/aspirational; plaintiffs fail to plead actionable misrepresentation separate from the safe-harbor problem |
| Whether other defenses (standing, Rule 9(b), First Amendment) require dismissal | Plaintiffs: Alleged injury and claims adequately pleaded; other defenses are inapplicable or premature | Nestlé: Raised multiple alternative grounds for dismissal | Held: Court did not reach these issues because safe harbor dispositive |
| Remedy/leave to amend | Plaintiffs: Could amend to cure deficiencies | Nestlé: Dismissal with prejudice appropriate | Court: Dismissal with prejudice; amendment would be futile |
Key Cases Cited
- Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163 (Cal. 1999) (formulated California "safe harbor" principle under UCL)
- Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2011) (applied safe-harbor analysis to UCL and CLRA claims)
- Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) (limited statutory disclosure trigger does not always create safe harbor)
- Loeffler v. Target Corp., 58 Cal.4th 1081 (Cal. 2014) (dismissing UCL claims where compliance with statutory provision provided safe harbor)
- Lopez v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 201 Cal.App.4th 572 (Cal. Ct. App.) (safe harbor where statutory accuracy standards applied)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (legal conclusions not accepted as true on Rule 12(b)(6))
- Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motion)