Barbara Runge v. Barbara Runge, 2018 COA 23

Background

Barbara Runge (wife) and David Runge (husband) entered a 2011 separation agreement incorporated into their dissolution decree after extensive pre-decree disclosure and a temporary-orders hearing.
Four years and 364 days after entry of the decree, wife moved under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) to reopen property division, alleging husband omitted or misstated material assets and seeking discovery and reallocation.
Husband moved to dismiss, arguing (1) wife’s motion failed to state sufficient grounds under Rule 16.2(e)(10) and (2) the district court lost subject-matter jurisdiction because the five-year retention period expired the day after the motion was filed.
The district court rejected the jurisdictional objection but granted dismissal on the merits, finding wife’s allegations speculative and insufficient to trigger reallocation or discovery under Rule 16.2(e)(10).
The Court of Appeals affirmed: it held the Warne/Iqbal “plausibility” standard for pleadings did not apply to this motion, the motion was timely filed (so the court had jurisdiction to rule), and wife failed to allege facts sufficient to require discovery or reallocation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Runge)	Defendant's Argument (Runge)	Held
Whether the Warne/Iqbal "plausibility" standard applies to dismissal of a C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) motion	Warne plausibility should govern any dismissal for failure to state grounds	Rule 12(b)(5)/Warne does not apply to non-pleading motions; different standard controls	Warne/Iqbal plausibility does not apply because the motion is not a pleading and 12(b)(5) was not invoked; court did not err in declining to apply it
Whether the district court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on a motion filed within five years but decided after the five-year period	The court retained jurisdiction because the motion was filed within the five-year retention period	The court lost jurisdiction the moment the five-year retention period expired	Majority: filing within five years invoked jurisdiction and the court could decide the motion after the window closed; concurrence agrees with result but analyzes jurisdiction similarly; dissent would have held jurisdiction ended when five years elapsed
Whether wife alleged sufficient misstatements/omissions under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) to trigger reallocation of assets	Wife alleged nondisclosure/understatement of business interests and mortgage debt, and pointed to later valuation as evidence	Husband produced extensive pre-decree disclosures, allowed investigation, and certified required disclosures; wife’s claims were speculative	Held: allegations were speculative and insufficient; Rule 16.2(e)(10) provides a narrow remedy and was not intended to permit post-decree discovery or revaluation absent concrete pre-decree omissions
Whether Rule 16.2(e)(10) authorizes post-decree discovery or revaluation of disclosed assets	Wife sought discovery to investigate and prove alleged nondisclosures/misrepresentations	Husband and court: rule does not create a post-decree discovery right; parties are bound by pre-decree disclosures and settlement choices	Held: Rule 16.2(e)(10) does not authorize reopening for the purpose of post-decree discovery or revaluation where party settled despite access to pre-decree materials

Key Cases Cited

In re Marriage of Schelp, 228 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2010) (explaining Rule 16.2 disclosure duties and five-year retention to reallocate for misstatements/omissions)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (articulating the federal plausibility standard for pleadings)
People v. Anderson, 828 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1992) (motion is not a pleading for purposes of the rules)
Robbins v. A.B. Goldberg, 185 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2008) (nunc pro tunc relief and remedies for court delay in certain circumstances)
In re Marriage of Nevarez, 170 P.3d 808 (Colo. App. 2007) (valuation date is at decree or hearing)
Shirley v. Merritt, 364 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1961) (value is a matter of opinion, not fact)