Barbara Hill, individually and as guardian of Charles Hill, incapacitated, and as next friend of Alexandra Hill, a minor,et al. v. Erich E. Gephart, City of Indianapolis
2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 142
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Nov. 25, 2011, Charles Hill and his young daughter walked along Fox Hill Drive (no sidewalks) toward home; Charles walked on the right side of the roadway facing away from traffic and was on his cellphone.
- Deputy Gephart, driving a Marion County jail transport van westbound, struck Charles in low-light conditions; Charles was wearing dark clothing and suffered severe injuries.
- Police investigation noted low light and dark clothing as primary causal factors and could not precisely fix Charles’s position at impact.
- Hills sued Deputy Gephart, the City of Indianapolis, and Marion County Sheriff’s Department for negligence; defendants moved for summary judgment asserting Deputy Gephart was not negligent and that Charles was contributorily negligent under Ind. Code § 9-21-17-14.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Hills appealed.
- The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding contributory negligence was a factual question for a jury because Davison’s rebuttable-presumption framework applies to pedestrian violations of vehicle statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper on contributory negligence | Charles’s statute violation was justifiable and reasonable (avoided crossing, vegetation/absent sidewalk on left); question for jury | Charles violated Ind. Code § 9-21-17-14 (walked on wrong side) and thus is presumptively negligent; facts permit only one inference | Reversed: contributory negligence is for the jury; genuine issue exists whether Charles rebutted presumption of negligence |
| Whether the Davison rebuttable-presumption rule applies to pedestrian statutory violations | Davison applies; a pedestrian may justify noncompliance by showing reasonable conduct under circumstances | Defendants relied on Larkins to argue impossibility not shown, so summary judgment appropriate | Court applied Davison’s test to pedestrian duties and remanded for jury determination |
Key Cases Cited
- M.S.D. of Martinsville v. Jackson, 9 N.E.3d 230 (summary judgment standard and negligence cases are fact-sensitive)
- Funston v. School Town of Munster, 849 N.E.2d 595 (Ind. 2006) (contributory negligence bars recovery if it proximately contributed)
- Whitmore v. South Bend Public Transp. Corp., 7 N.E.3d 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (contributory negligence standard and jury allocation)
- Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 98 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. 1951) (discusses impossibility to comply with statute as excuse)
- Davison v. Williams, 242 N.E.2d 101 (Ind. 1968) (violation of safety regulation creates rebuttable presumption of negligence; test for rebuttal)
- American Carloading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Sav. Bank, 25 N.E.2d 777 (Ind. 1940) (reciprocal duties of drivers and pedestrians to exercise reasonable care)