Banks v. Slay
875 F.3d 876
8th Cir.2017Background
- In July 2002 St. Louis Police Officer Reginald Williams allegedly threatened, robbed, and falsely arrested Michael Banks; Williams was later criminally convicted for related misconduct.
- In August 2005 Banks and his wife filed a § 1983 suit naming Williams (personal and official capacities) and members of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners (official capacities).
- After procedural dismissals and amendments, the Bankses filed a January 2009 complaint served on each Board member; no responsive pleadings were filed and the state court entered default judgment against Williams in both personal and official capacities for $1,487,553.49.
- The Bankses sought to enforce the default judgment against the Board/City of St. Louis; the state enforcement attempts failed procedurally and the Bankses obtained mandamus relief in federal district court ordering the City to pay.
- The district court denied post-judgment interest (finding Missouri requires interest to be included or timely requested) and awarded reduced attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; the Bankses appealed and the City cross-appealed various rulings.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: (1) the default official-capacity judgment binds the governmental entity when properly served and given opportunity to respond; (2) mandamus was appropriate under Missouri law to enforce the judgment; (3) denial of post-judgment interest and reductions in § 1988 fees were not erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an official-capacity judgment against an individual binds the government entity when the entity was properly served but not named | Banks: An official-capacity suit operates as a suit against the government entity; a default judgment against the official should be enforceable against the entity if it received notice | Municipal Appellants: Graham/Brandon require the government entity to be named; because the entity was unnamed it cannot be bound/enforced against | Held: Official-capacity suit is effectively against the entity; proper service gave notice and the judgment can be enforced against the City (affirmed) |
| Whether the Board/City received constitutionally adequate notice such that the default judgment may be enforced | Banks: Service on Board members and emailed notice to AG suffice as notice and opportunity to respond | Municipal Appellants: procedural history and emails show lack of adequate notice; judgment should not bind them | Held: Service complied with Missouri procedure and constituted adequate notice; defendants had opportunity to defend; judgment enforceable |
| Whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy to compel City payment of the judgment | Banks: Mandamus is proper under Missouri law to enforce judgment against public entity | City: Opposed enforcement because of notice/naming issues and other defenses | Held: Mandamus was proper; district court correctly ordered City to pay as successor-in-interest |
| Whether post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees awards were proper | Banks: Post-judgment interest statute change entitles them to interest; requested § 1988 fees were reasonable | City: No post-judgment interest was requested in judgment; district court correctly limited fees | Held: Denial of post-judgment interest affirmed (must be included or timely sought); district court’s reductions in attorney’s fees affirmed as not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (official-capacity suit is, in substance, a suit against the government entity when entity receives notice and opportunity to respond)
- Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985) (treatment of official-capacity suits as suits against the officeholder’s entity)
- Roberts v. Dillon, 15 F.3d 113 (8th Cir. 1994) (naming the government entity in official-capacity suit is redundant)
- Jeffers v. Clinton, 992 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1993) (appeal by an official sued in official capacity provided fair notice that the government entity sought to appeal)
- Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946) (judgment procured without notice may be unenforceable on due process grounds)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (standards for awarding attorney’s fees and appellate review for abuse of discretion)
- Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (limits on arbitrary adjustments to fee awards)
- Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2010) (circuit precedent upholding percentage reductions for overbroad fee requests)