Banks v. Hobbs
2013 Ark. 377
Ark.2013Background
- Banks was convicted of rape in 1999 and sentenced as a habitual offender to 40 years.
- Banks was also convicted of first-degree battery in 2000 and sentenced as a habitual offender to 60 years, running concurrently with the rape sentence.
- In 2010 Banks filed a petition for writ of mandamus in Lincoln County Circuit Court arguing the prison records supervisor failed to credit earned meritorious good time for parole eligibility.
- The circuit court denied the petition, and Banks appealed the denial.
- The issue centers on whether the writ of mandamus could compel credit for meritorious good time and how parole eligibility is calculated for concurrent sentences.
- The Supreme CourtAffirmed the circuit court’s denial of the mandamus petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mandamus lies to compel credit for meritorious good time for parole eligibility | Banks claimed lack of credit affects parole timing | ADC has sole authority to determine parole eligibility | No mandamus relief; rights determined by statute and DOC authority |
| How parole eligibility is calculated for rape with concurrent sentences | Introductory language of 16-93-611 supports exclusive focus on the first-degree-battery sentence | Parole is governed by statute at time of crime; concurrent sentence does not change credit | Statute requires 70% of term for rape; concurrent battery does not deprive earned good time benefits |
| Effect of 16-93-611 amendments on appellant’s argument | Act 1337 would exempt kidnapping from 70% rule | Act 1337 not applicable; kidnapping provision not controlling here | Inapplicable to this case; parole for rape remains 70% rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Aguilar v. Lester, 2011 Ark. 329 (Ark. 2011) (mandamus requires clear right and lack of other remedies; not a matter of discretion)
- Boles v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 410, 12 S.W.3d 201 (Ark. 2000) (parole eligibility determined by law in effect at crime time)
- Clardy v. State, 2011 Ark. 201 (Ark. 2011) (parole eligibility within DOC discretion)
- Morris v. State, 333 Ark. 466, 970 S.W.2d 210 (Ark. 1998) (parole eligibility determination within DOC authority)
- Abernathy v. State, 2012 Ark. 59, 386 S.W.3d 477 (Ark. 2012) (pro se briefs held to same standards; no special consideration)
- Moon v. Holloway, 353 Ark. 520, 110 S.W.3d 250 (Ark. 2003) (pro se appellants must follow briefing rules)