Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 134 So. 3d 706

Five former Head Start attendees sued Sherwin-Williams alleging lead paint on Rosedale Head Start playground equipment caused elevated blood-lead levels in the 1990s.
Sherwin-Williams sold six gallons of lead paint (1 yellow, 4 red, 1 orange) to Bolivar County Head Start between 1986–1991; no direct evidence tied those specific cans to the playground equipment.
In 1985, WREN (Vickers) sandblasted and repainted the equipment with non-lead paint; thereafter Head Start employees (including janitor James Lewis) did subsequent painting.
Testing in 2000 found lead paint on playground equipment in multiple colors (including red and yellow); experts disagreed whether the chemical profile matched Sherwin-Williams’ formulas.
Trial court granted Sherwin-Williams summary judgment for failure to establish product identification; the plaintiffs appealed and the appellate court reviewed whether circumstantial evidence sufficed to create a factual issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the lead paint on playground equipment came from Sherwin-Williams	Circumstantial evidence (company sold red/yellow lead paint to Head Start; Head Start employees — not outside contractors — painted equipment after 1985; majority of Head Start paint purchases came from Sherwin-Williams; Lewis purchased paint from Sherwin-Williams) supports a reasonable inference Sherwin-Williams’ paint was used	Evidence undermines product ID (chemical analyses allegedly mismatch Sherwin-Williams’ formulas; purchases from other vendors; timing of testing; policies against lead use); plaintiffs’ evidence is speculative	Reversed trial court: viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, circumstantial evidence was sufficient to create a jury question on product identification; summary judgment improper

Poppenheimer v. Estate of Coyle, 98 So.3d 1059 (Miss. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment is de novo)
Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'l Airport Auth., 97 So.3d 68 (Miss. 2012) (evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party)
Buckel v. Chaney, 47 So.3d 148 (Miss. 2010) (circumstantial evidence can defeat summary judgment if it allows reasonable inference beyond mere conjecture)
Anglado v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 716 So.2d 543 (Miss. 1998) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiffs offered no evidence tying defendant to contamination)
First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (U.S. 1968) (summary judgment requires only enough evidence to present a genuine factual dispute to the factfinder)
Moore ex rel. Moore v. Miss. Valley Gas Co., 863 So.2d 43 (Miss. 2003) (plaintiff must show the defendant’s product caused the injury in products-liability actions)