189 Conn. App. 477
Conn. App. Ct.2019Background
- Bank of America sued to foreclose a mortgage on property formerly owned by Anna S. Grogins; the note dated July 19, 2007, was in default before her death in 2010. The mortgage was later assigned and U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. was substituted as plaintiff.
- David Grogins (executor/trustee) was defaulted for failure to disclose a defense and the court entered a judgment of strict foreclosure with a law day in 2015; a bankruptcy filing temporarily stayed the sale.
- After the bankruptcy stay ended, the substitute plaintiff obtained reentry of judgment and reset law days; the defendants then filed a motion to open the strict foreclosure judgment more than twenty days after notice.
- The defendants’ motion asserted (in an attached explication) that David Grogins had been intermittently ill during the proceedings (preventing a proper defense) and that there was a good‑faith defense alleging the loan was part of Bank of America’s predatory HSSL program.
- At an evidentiary hearing spread over several dates, defendants presented witnesses about alleged predatory lending and fraud but presented no evidence of Grogins’ illness or other explanation for failing to disclose defenses; prior counsel testified he was unaware of any defenses at the time.
- The trial court denied the motion to open, finding the defendants failed to show good cause to open a strict foreclosure judgment and that their own negligence contributed to the failure to plead defenses. The Appellate Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure filed >20 days after notice | The court properly exercised discretion: defendants failed to show good cause independent of merits and presented insufficient evidence | Defendants argued the court applied § 52‑212 (default judgments) instead of § 49‑15 (strict foreclosure), improperly relying on negligence and requiring showing of mistake/accident | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; defendants failed to show good cause not based wholly on merits, and the court’s consideration of negligence did not vitiate its independent finding of insufficient cause |
| Whether § 49‑15 requires a showing of prevention by mistake/accident (like § 52‑212) | Plaintiff: § 49‑15 controls and only requires cause shown; trial court correctly concluded lack of independent good cause | Defendants: § 49‑15 does not require showing of mistake/accident, so negligence should not be dispositive | Court noted § 49‑15 governs but concluded that, regardless of statute cited, defendants failed to show good cause independent of merits; negligence was only one factor and did not undermine that conclusion |
| Whether defendants’ evidentiary showing was sufficient to justify opening (illness claim) | Plaintiff: defendants presented no evidence of illness or excuse for failing to disclose defenses; prior counsel gave no justification | Defendants: illness and good‑faith belief in predatory‑lending defense justified opening | Held: defendants produced no evidence of illness and failed to explain their prior lack of investigation; evidence insufficient to open judgment |
| Whether the invited‑error doctrine bars appellate review because defendants cited the wrong statute | Plaintiff: defendants induced error by citing § 52‑212 in their form | Defendants: substantive control should be § 49‑15; appellate review appropriate | Appellate Court declined to apply invited‑error doctrine because the trial court understood § 49‑15 applied and nonetheless found lack of independent good cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341 (Conn. 1990) (distinguishes § 52‑212 from § 49‑15 and limits opening strict foreclosure judgments to good cause not based wholly on merits)
- JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mendez, 320 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2015) (court may deny relief under equitable authority where procedural/statutory requirements are not outcome‑determinative)
- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ruggiri, 164 Conn. App. 479 (Conn. App. 2016) (appeal from denial of motion to open filed >20 days tests only abuse of discretion, not underlying merits)
- USA Bank v. Schulz, 143 Conn. App. 412 (Conn. App. 2013) (defendant cannot claim abuse of discretion for relief he could have sought earlier while represented by counsel)
- Snowdon v. Grillo, 114 Conn. App. 131 (Conn. App. 2009) (invited‑error doctrine bars appellate review of errors induced by a party)
- Hodgate v. Ferraro, 123 Conn. App. 443 (Conn. App. 2010) (limitations on applying invited‑error doctrine where party previously advocated for a position at trial)