Bank Markazi v. Peterson
136 S. Ct. 1310
SCOTUS2016Background
- Over 1,000 U.S. nationals obtained default judgments (in 16 separate suits) against Iran under the FSIA terrorism exception and sought to execute on about $1.75 billion in bond assets held in a New York account that they alleged belonged to Bank Markazi (Iran’s central bank).
- The assets had been blocked by Executive Order under IEEPA; enforcement attempts began in 2008 and were consolidated in an interpleader/turnover proceeding in SDNY (Peterson, No. 10‑CIV‑4518).
- Congress enacted 22 U.S.C. §8772 (2012) designating the specific assets identified in the SDNY docket as subject to execution to satisfy compensatory damages against Iran, and requiring the court to find (inter alia) that Iran holds equitable or beneficial title and that no one else has a constitutionally protected interest.
- Bank Markazi conceded equitable/beneficial ownership after §8772’s passage but argued the statute violated the separation of powers by dictating the result in pending litigation and by targeting a single proceeding by caption and docket number.
- The District Court ordered turnover after making the required findings; the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether §8772 violated Article III.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Respondents) | Defendant's Argument (Bank Markazi) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §8772 violates Article III by directing a particular result in pending enforcement proceedings | §8772 is a valid change of law to aid enforcement of existing judgments and may be applied retroactively to pending cases | §8772 usurps the judicial power by prescribing results for a particular pending case (or narrowly targeted proceedings) | Court: §8772 is a permissible retroactive change in governing law; it does not prescribe findings under old law and leaves factual application to the court — no Article III violation |
| Whether Congress may enact a statute that identifies the relevant proceedings by caption and docket number | Such identification is permissible shorthand for the category of execution claims consolidated in the enforcement proceeding | Targeting a single (or a few) pending cases is unconstitutional particularized legislation that decides the case | Court: statutes need not be generally applicable; §8772 applies to many claimants across multiple suits consolidated for execution and is consistent with precedent permitting narrow statutes |
| Whether §8772 impermissibly intrudes into traditional judicial factfinding by making the outcome a foregone conclusion | The statute supplies new legal standards (e.g., allowing execution if equitable/beneficial ownership is shown) for the court to apply to the record | Because the facts relevant to §8772 were uncontested, the law effectively commanded the result and thus invaded judicial power | Court: applying new substantive law to undisputed facts is permissible; statutes may change law retroactively and be outcome-determinative without violating Article III |
| Whether foreign-affairs context or prior executive practice affects separation-of-powers analysis | Foreign-affairs and executive blocking of assets support congressional authority to regulate availability of foreign-state property for execution | Political-branch practice does not justify Congress deciding a particular pending case | Court: political-branch authority over foreign affairs and historical practice of case-specific executive determinations weigh in favor of §8772’s validity; Congress acted within foreign-relations authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (establishing judicial duty to say what the law is)
- Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (Congress may not reopen final judgments; discussion of limits on retroactive legislation)
- Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429 (Congress may amend applicable law and make it retroactive to pending cases)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (limits on retroactive civil legislation and analysis for retroactivity)
- United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (13 Wall. 128) (1872) (Congress may not prescribe rules of decision to courts in pending cases — foundational but ambiguous)
- United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (authority that retroactive change in law may control pending cases)
- Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (statute applying new law to uncontested facts in pending cases can be valid)
- Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (political branches’ control over disposition of foreign-state property and claims in foreign-affairs context)