Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698

Background

Gregory Banister was convicted in Texas of aggravated assault and sentenced to 30 years; after state remedies he filed a federal habeas petition that the district court denied.
Banister timely filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion (to alter or amend the judgment); the district court denied that motion within days.
Banister then filed a notice of appeal timed from the district court’s disposition of the Rule 59(e) motion.
The Fifth Circuit construed Banister’s Rule 59(e) filing as a second or successive habeas application under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) and dismissed his appeal as untimely.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a Rule 59(e) motion in a habeas case is a "second or successive" petition under AEDPA, and whether the Rule 59(e) filing tolled the appeal deadline.
The Court (majority) held that a timely Rule 59(e) motion is not a second or successive habeas petition under §2244(b) and therefore tolls/apply for purposes of the appeals clock; it reversed the Fifth Circuit.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Banister)	Defendant's Argument (Davis)	Held
Whether a Rule 59(e) motion in a habeas case is a "second or successive" application under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)	Rule 59(e) is part of the initial habeas proceeding (historical use, narrow 28‑day scope, merges with final judgment)	A Rule 59(e) that attacks the court’s merits decision functions as a successive habeas petition and must meet §2244(b) gatekeeping	Majority: Rule 59(e) is not second or successive; it is part of the first proceeding and §2244(b) does not apply
Whether filing a Rule 59(e) motion tolls/suspends the finality of judgment for purposes of the appeal deadline	Yes — a timely Rule 59(e) suspends finality and the 30‑day appeal clock runs from disposition of that motion	No — if the filing is a successive petition it does not toll the appeal deadline and the appeal was untimely	Held for Banister: appeal time runs from disposition of the Rule 59(e) motion; his appeal was timely
Whether Gonzalez v. Crosby (Rule 60(b) treated as successive when it attacks merits) controls Rule 59(e) motions	Gonzalez is distinguishing: Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) differ historically and functionally; Gonzalez does not govern	Gonzalez’s merits‑vs‑integrity test should apply equally — a merits attack is successive regardless of label	Majority: Gonzalez does not control; Rule 59(e) differs materially from Rule 60(b) and is not treated the same
Whether pre‑AEDPA practice and AEDPA’s purposes support treating Rule 59(e) as part of the initial habeas proceeding	Historical usage (Browder and many pre‑AEDPA decisions) and AEDPA’s aims (efficiency, finality) support permitting Rule 59(e) motions	Dissent: pre‑AEDPA practice does not reliably show Rule 59(e) was exempt; allowing Rule 59(e) will enable circumvention of §2244(b)	Majority: history and AEDPA’s goals point toward allowing Rule 59(e) as part of the first application

Key Cases Cited

Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (held Rule 59(e) applies in habeas proceedings; derived from common‑law term‑of‑court power)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (held a Rule 60(b) motion that attacks the merits of a prior habeas ruling is a successive petition)
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (explains “second or successive” is a term of art; chronology alone is not dispositive)
White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445 (1982) (describes Rule 59(e) as a limited tool to correct mistakes in the period immediately following judgment)
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (describes pre‑AEDPA abuse‑of‑the‑writ limits on repetitive habeas petitions)
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989) (Rule 59(e) suspension of finality and merging of rulings for appeal)
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) (appeal from a Rule 60(b) denial is a separate final order)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (discusses the merger of post‑judgment disposition into the final judgment on appeal)