398 F.Supp.3d 560
N.D. Cal.2019Background
- Plaintiffs Lyndsey and Sharon Ballinger are Oakland homeowners who rented their three‑bedroom house while on military assignment and later returned, triggering an owner‑move‑in eviction.
- Oakland enacted the Uniform Residential Tenant Relocation Ordinance (2018), requiring uniform relocation payments to tenants for qualifying no‑fault evictions (set amounts by unit size, payable in stages based on tenant tenure).
- The Ballingers paid the required relocation amount to their tenants and sued the City challenging the Ordinance on multiple constitutional grounds, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
- They asserted six causes of action: facial physical taking (private purpose), unconstitutional exaction (facial and as‑applied), as‑applied physical taking, Fourth Amendment seizure, substantive due process, and Contract Clause violation.
- The City moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court granted dismissal of all claims without leave to amend, concluding plaintiffs failed to plead any cognizable legal theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ordinance effects a facial physical taking for a private purpose | Ordinance compels landlords to transfer funds to private tenants, amounting to a physical taking for private benefit | Ordinance is generally regulatory and not a physical taking; no compensable taking occurred | Dismissed — no taking alleged; court finds no cognizable physical‑taking claim |
| Whether Ordinance is an unconstitutional exaction | Conditioning owners’ right to regain possession on paying relocation is an unlawful exaction requiring nexus/rough proportionality | Exaction doctrine applies to adjudicative, parcel‑specific permit conditions, not generally applicable legislation like this Ordinance | Dismissed — Ordinance is generally applicable legislation; Nollan/Dolan exaction framework inapplicable |
| Whether as‑applied physical taking exists because Ordinance forces payment of money | Compelled payment to tenants is a physical taking of property (money) as applied to plaintiffs | Obligation to pay money to private parties does not constitute a per se physical taking requiring compensation | Dismissed — payment obligation is not a physical taking under Supreme Court precedent |
| Whether Ordinance effects an unreasonable Fourth Amendment seizure | City forces owners to choose between losing home or paying money (a seizure of money/property) | The alleged seizure is not state action by third parties; statute authorizes private transfers and is not a Fourth Amendment seizure | Dismissed — plaintiffs failed to allege state action causing a constitutional deprivation |
| Whether Ordinance violates substantive due process (arbitrary/retroactive) | Ordinance is retroactive and irrational, upsetting plaintiffs’ expectations and imposing arbitrary burdens | Ordinance is not retroactive in law and survives rational basis review as advancing legitimate tenant‑protection interests | Dismissed — not retroactive and rationally related to legitimate governmental purpose |
| Whether Ordinance impairs preexisting contracts in violation of Contract Clause | Ordinance substantially impairs landlord–tenant lease expectations by adding new financial obligations | Landlord–tenant relations are heavily regulated; extension of relocation payments does not substantially impair the contract | Dismissed — no substantial impairment of contract; Clause claim fails |
| Standing for injunctive/declaratory relief | Plaintiffs seek prospective relief against reapplication of Ordinance | City argues plaintiffs lack standing for injunctive/declaratory relief | Court did not decide because substantive claims were dismissed and plaintiffs did not oppose standing argument; relief claims dismissed with case closure |
Key Cases Cited
- Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (establishing §1983 takings procedure without state‑remedy exhaustion)
- Tahoe‑Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (distinguishing physical and regulatory takings)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (total regulatory takings doctrine)
- Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (ad hoc regulatory takings balancing)
- Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (limits on treating regulations as physical takings)
- Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (regulation goes too far may be a taking)
- Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (public use/public purpose doctrine in takings)
- Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (public use standard)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (unconstitutional exaction: nexus requirement)
- Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (unconstitutional exaction: rough proportionality requirement)
- Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (monetary exactions subject to Nollan/Dolan in adjudicative permitting context)
- McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (Ninth Circuit: Nollan/Dolan apply to individual permit conditions, not general legislation)
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (per se taking where government requires permanent physical installation)
- Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (mandate to relinquish identifiable property may be a per se taking)
- Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (plurality/deliberations recognizing obligations to pay money generally do not constitute takings)