Balentine v. Thaler
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23699
| 5th Cir. | 2010Background
- Balentine murdered three teenagers in Amarillo, Texas on January 21, 1998; convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in April 1999; CCA affirmed conviction and sentence in 2002.
- Balentine filed a state post-conviction habeas corpus petition in January 2001 with 21 grounds; state district court denied relief in October 2002; CCA denied relief in December 2002.
- Balentine pursued a federal habeas petition filed December 2003 and amended August 2004; claimed nine grounds including a right to individualized sentencing; district court denied; this court affirmed in 2009.
- Balentine filed a second state habeas application under Art. 11.071 in August 2009 alleging ineffective assistance in mitigating investigation and Batson concerns; CCA dismissed September 2009 without explanation of grounds.
- Balentine filed a Rule 60(b) motion in federal court seeking relief from the 2008 rulings; district court denied; stayed execution; this court granted stay pending en banc reconsideration, which was later withdrawn and substituted.
- On appeal, the court evaluates whether the 2009 CCA order rested on independent adequate state grounds, and whether Rule 60(b) relief was proper given AEDPA and Crosby/Ruiz framework; ultimately affirms district court’s denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b) relief may be used to revisit merits-based habeas determinations when the state court’s ruling rests on independent state grounds | Balentine argues 60(b) can reach merits if state ruling was on federal merits | Texas contends 60(b) addresses non-merits issues only; would not override AEDPA limits | Rule 60(b) relief was not available to merits; the district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether the 2009 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals order reached the merits or rested on an independent adequate state ground | Balentine asserts the Texas court reached merits of Wiggins claim | Texas contends decision rested on Article 11.071 §5(a) grounds independent of federal merits | The order rested on independent and adequate state grounds; no merits review at federal level |
| Whether Balentine's Wiggins claim was properly presented in the federal petition and AEDPA time bar analysis | Balentine contends his Wiggins claim was raised as IAC in federal petition and not a new claim | Texas argues the Wiggins claim was not presented as such in initial petition, affecting AEDPA interpretation | The Wiggins claim was presented as Sixth Amendment IAC; not a new claim barred by AEDPA |
| Whether the balance of balancing the Crosby/ Ruiz/ Coleman framework supports treating the state-court denial as a merits determination or not | Balentine relies on Ruiz to treat the Texas denial as merits-based | Texas relies on Coleman Long framework to treat the denial as based on state grounds | Ruiz-based inference of merits absence was rejected; Coleman framework governs, supporting state-ground basis |
| Whether Balentine adequately satisfied Article 11.071 §5(a) subsections to permit merits review in state court | Balentine argued facts satisfied §5(a)(1) or (3) for merits review | State contends he failed to show unavailability or clear and convincing evidence under the statute | Balentine failed to present sufficient specific facts under §5(a)(1) and (3); merits review barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Crosby v. United States, 545 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 2005) (AEDPA and Rule 60(b) harmony; specify when 60(b) can apply to non-merits)
- Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2007) (presumption about whether state court decision rested on federal grounds)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1991) (presumption framework for independent and adequate state grounds; avoid merits review when applicable)
- Long v. Johnson, 463 U.S. 1032 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1983) (presumption for unclear state-ground determinations)
- Ex parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. Crim. App., 2007) (Texas standard for evaluating whether a subsequent application satisfies §5(a))
