Baker v. The Forest of Preserve District of Cook County
33 N.E.3d 745
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- In 2006 Royalty Properties, LLC and Cannon Squires Properties, LLC took a loan secured by Horizon Farms; guarantors included Richard and Meryl Cannon. Amcore Bank held the mortgage and note.
- Amcore failed and BMO Harris acquired Amcore’s assets, including the Horizon Farms note.
- On March 19, 2013 the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (FPD) purchased the mortgage note from BMO for $14 million and became assignee of the mortgage; FPD substituted into the pending foreclosure as plaintiff.
- A foreclosure judgment was entered for FPD August 30, 2013; FPD credit‑bid at the October 18, 2013 sale, was highest bidder, and received a sheriff’s deed in May 2014.
- Taxpayers (plaintiffs) filed a taxpayer suit challenging FPD’s authority to buy the mortgage/note and to use public funds to pursue foreclosure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on Counts I and II and dismissed Count III. Plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction (collateral attack concern) | Plaintiffs: suit is a taxpayer action distinct from foreclosure and challenges statutory authority; not a collateral attack. | Defendants: taxpayer suit would affect the foreclosure judgment; appellate court lacks jurisdiction over collateral attack. | Court: jurisdiction exists; suits differ in nature (taxpayer v. foreclosure defense), so review is permissible. |
| Mootness | Plaintiffs: controversy remains because taxpayers can seek recovery of unlawfully expended public funds; exceptions apply if necessary. | Defendants: after confirmation and deed the issue is moot; no live controversy. | Court: not moot — plaintiffs seek declaratory/return relief and taxpayers can pursue recovery of public funds even after expenditure. |
| Statutory authority to acquire property | Plaintiffs: District Act allows acquisition only in fee simple; buying a mortgage/note gives only a lien (mortgage‑lien theory) and FPD exceeded its powers by spending public funds pre‑title. | Defendants: District Act permits acquisition in fee simple by various manners (purchase, gift, etc.); statute does not require simultaneous vesting of fee simple title with payment; purpose (public use) controls. | Court: FPD acted within statutory authority; "fee simple" language does not impose an immediate vesting requirement or bar purchase of mortgage/note leading to foreclosure acquisition. |
| Internal code / procedural compliance | Plaintiffs: FPD Code requires paying purchase price "upon delivery of property instruments"; FPD violated its own rule. | Defendants: internal procedural rules do not create judicially enforceable limits on statutory authority; courts generally will not police internal legislative procedures. | Court: will not invalidate acquisition based on alleged failure to follow FPD’s internal code; internal rule review inappropriate in this taxpayer action. |
Key Cases Cited
- Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498 (statutory construction/summary judgment standard)
- R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153 (jurisdiction must be established before proceeding)
- Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 237 Ill. 2d 391 (courts may not read into statutes limitations the legislature did not express)
- Forest Preserve District v. Jirsa, 336 Ill. 624 (special‑district powers are creations of the legislature and strictly construed)
- Perkins v. Board of Commissioners, 271 Ill. 449 (historical treatment of "fee simple" in forest preserve enabling legislation)