284 P.3d 400
N.M. Ct. App.2012Background
- The MMA defines health care provider as entities licensed or certified to provide health care or professional services.
- Plaintiffs allege Defendants are not health care providers despite MMA coverage; Defendants are professional corporations and an LLC.
- Three interlocutory appeals consolidated: Gordon (Lovelace Health System et al.), Baker (doctors and professional corporations), Campos (professional corporations).
- Defendants obtained MMA insurance and surcharges; district courts largely treated Defendants as qualified health care providers.
- Legislative history and purpose of MMA focus on broad participation to ensure patient compensation and provider insurance.
- Court must decide whether corporate entities fall within the MMA’s health care provider definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 41-5-3(A) include corporate entities as health care providers? | Gordon/Baker/Campos contend only certain persons qualify. | Defendants argue broad construction to include corporations. | Yes, corporations qualify under MMA as health care providers. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cummings v. X-Ray Assoc. of New Mexico, P.C., 121 N.M. 821 (1996-NMSC-035) (statutory interpretation context; MMA scope)
- Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482 (1985) (reliance on superintendent’s representations; eligibility)
- Roberts v. Southwestern Community Health Services, 114 N.M. 248 (1992) (MMA qualification and damages framework)
- Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336 (1991) (statutory construction; avoid constitutional issues)
- Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers, 125 N.M. 401 (1998-NMSC-020) (statutory interpretation; legislative intent)
- Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511 (1989) (legislative purpose and insurance framework in MMA)