554 S.W.3d 426
Mo. Ct. App.2018Background
- Borrowers sued multiple mortgage-related defendants under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA) seeking penalties/forfeitures and other relief; defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment as time-barred.
- Trial court applied the three-year limitations period in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.130(2) and dismissed/entered summary judgment for several lenders; the appeals court reviewed de novo.
- Borrowers argued MSMLA claims should instead be governed by the six-year discovery-based limitations period in § 516.420 and raised alternative tolling/ accrual theories if the three-year period applied.
- The central factual nexus: defendants are corporate mortgage lenders or servicers (i.e., “moneyed corporations”); there was no genuine dispute about material facts relevant to the statute-of-limitations defense.
- The appeals court concluded § 516.420 applies to actions against moneyed corporations for penalties/forfeitures or to enforce statutory liabilities and reversed the dismissals and summary judgments as untimely under the shorter statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which limitations period governs MSMLA claims against corporate lenders? | § 516.420 (six-year discovery rule) controls because defendants are moneyed corporations. | § 516.130(2) (three-year) controls; § 516.420 applies only to criminal/penal statutes or is limited to sections listed. | § 516.420 governs MSMLA suits against moneyed corporations; six-year discovery-based period applies. |
| Whether the court should rely on Eighth Circuit precedent (Rashaw) rejecting § 516.420's civil application | Schwartz controlling; § 516.420's plain language and history show civil application. | Rashaw and progeny interpret § 516.420 as limited to criminal penal statutes, so § 516.130(2) applies. | Rejected Rashaw; federal interpretations are not binding and misread § 516.420's plain text and history. |
| Does § 516.420’s introductory reference to §§ 516.380-.420 limit its scope so it cannot displace § 516.130(2)? | No — § 516.420’s substantive language reaches beyond those sections and § 516.300 makes specific statutes control general ones. | Yes — omission of § 516.130 from the list shows intentional limitation. | Rejected defendant’s argument; § 516.420’s text and § 516.300 mean the six-year period controls for suits against moneyed corporations. |
| Must the court address Borrowers’ alternative accrual/tolling arguments? | If § 516.420 applies, alternatives (continuing wrong, relation back, class tolling, accrual on assignment/servicing) need not be reached. | Defendants relied on three-year accrual and alternative defenses to bar claims. | Court did not reach alternative arguments because it held § 516.420 applied; remanded for further proceedings (including jurisdictional issues). |
Key Cases Cited
- Armistead v. A.L.W. Grp., 60 S.W.3d 25 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (if petition on its face shows claim is barred, dismissal is proper)
- ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993) (summary judgment standards and affirmative defenses)
- Schwartz v. Bann-Cor Mortgage, 197 S.W.3d 168 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (MSMLA claims against mortgage companies governed by § 516.420 six-year period)
- Rashaw v. United Consumers Credit Union, 685 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2012) (contrary Eighth Circuit view that § 516.420 is limited to penal/criminal statutes)
- Mitchell v. [unnamed], 334 S.W.3d 502 (Mo. App. ?) (statutory construction principles regarding legislative intent and plain language)