437 P.3d 333
Utah2018Background
- Cottonwood Mall site was rezoned to a Regional/Mixed-Use (R/M-U) zone in 2007; development in R/M-U requires a site development master plan (SDMP) and an Agreement for the Development of Land (ADL).
- Cottonwood Mall, LLC previously approved a 2007 SDMP and 2008 ADL but the project stalled; Ivory Development later sought to revive redevelopment and submitted amendments in 2017–2018.
- In May 2018 the Holladay City Council passed Resolution 2018-16 approving the 2018 SDMP (amendment) and Resolution 2018-17 approving an Amended ADL (contractual agreement with the developer).
- Citizens gathered referendum signatures to force a public vote; City declined to place the measures on the ballot, treating the resolutions as administrative and not referable.
- Petitioners sought extraordinary writs; district court held Resolution 2018-16 (2018 SDMP) was legislative and referable, but Resolution 2018-17 (Amended ADL) was administrative and not referable; the City and Ivory appealed.
- The Utah Supreme Court affirmed: 2018-16 is legislative (referable); 2018-17 is administrative (not referable).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether approval of the 2018 SDMP (Resolution 2018-16) was legislative or administrative | Petitioners: SDMP functions as a general-plan–like rule for the R/M-U zone, involves broad policy weighing, so it is legislative and referable | Ivory/City: Approval was discretionary application of existing zoning framework, therefore administrative and not referable | Court: Legislative — SDMP is generally applicable and involved weighing broad, competing policy considerations; referable |
| Whether approval of the Amended ADL (Resolution 2018-17) was legislative or administrative | Petitioners: Contract purports to run with the land and thus is generally applicable and referable | Ivory/City: ADL is a contract among specific parties (not generally applicable); approval is administrative | Court: Administrative — ADL applies only to contracting parties and applies law to specific facts; not referable |
| Whether a development agreement that "runs with the land" automatically makes action legislative | Petitioners: Running with the land supports general applicability (citing Suarez) | Ivory/City: "Runs with the land" is not dispositive; many administrative land-use decisions also run with the land | Court: "Runs with the land" is relevant but not decisive; its import depends on substance (e.g., whether document creates general rules like a code) |
| Whether Carter/Krejci framework should be disavowed or limited | Ivory/City: Argued precedent over-emphasizes "runs with the land" notion and causes uncertainty | Petitioners: Precedent stands; supports referenda here | Court: Declined to disavow Carter/Krejci; applied their two hallmarks (general applicability; weighing broad policy) and found them controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- Carter v. Lehi City, 269 P.3d 141 (Utah 2012) (announces two hallmarks distinguishing legislative from administrative acts: laws of general applicability and weighing broad policy)
- Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 322 P.3d 662 (Utah 2013) (interprets general applicability in land-use context; distinguishes site-specific rezonings and administrative permits)
- Suarez v. Grand County, 296 P.3d 688 (Utah 2012) (upholds that an ordinance incorporating a development code and development agreement can be legislative)
- Flowell Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 361 P.3d 91 (Utah 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553 (Utah 2015) (stare decisis factors for overturning precedent)
- Stern v. Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy, 274 P.3d 935 (Utah 2012) (restrictive-covenant principles for when covenants bind successors)