BABY F. v. OKLAHOMA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, 2015 OK 24

Baby F., an infant in Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) custody, suffered severe congenital and respiratory conditions and required ongoing intensive care.
Treating physicians recommended changing his resuscitation status from full code to "Allow Natural Death" (DNR) because further aggressive treatment was deemed futile and painful.
The trial court, after a hearing and over Baby F.'s objection, granted the State's request under 10A O.S. 2011 § 1-3-102(C)(2) to authorize a DNR for a child in DHS custody and stayed the order pending appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
While the original action was pending in the Supreme Court, the trial court dismissed Baby F. from the deprived-child petition and returned custody to his parents so they could consent to the DNR; Baby F died shortly thereafter.
Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition from the Oklahoma Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of § 1-3-102(C)(2) as lacking substantive due process protections (no evidentiary standard or required findings).
The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction, denied the State's mootness motion, and issued a writ directing that future DNR/withdrawal-of-life-support orders for children in DHS custody require clear and convincing proof that the action is in the child’s best interest.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness of challenge after Baby F.'s death	Case fits exceptions; matter is broad public interest and likely to repeat yet evade review	Proceeding moot because child died and the specific controversy ended	Not moot — both public-interest and capable-of-repetition exceptions apply; motion to dismiss denied
Procedural jurisdiction to issue writ of prohibition	Original jurisdiction appropriate to prevent violation of fundamental rights when no adequate remedy by appeal exists	Trial court acted within statutory authority and followed notice/hearing requirements	Original jurisdiction assumed; writ available because constitutional rights at stake and appeal would be inadequate
Adequacy of § 1-3-102(C)(2) procedural protections	Statute lacks required substantive due-process safeguards: no evidentiary standard or mandated findings	Statute provides notice and hearing; sufficient procedural steps under its terms	Statute inadequate as written; notice/hearing alone do not satisfy substantive due process
Proper burden/metric for authorizing DNR or withdrawal of life support for a child in DHS custody	State must meet a heightened burden and specify findings to protect child and parental interests	Lower standard acceptable; existing notice/hearing sufficient	Court must require clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal/DNR is in the child’s best interest; best-interest finding is the controlling criterion

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upheld clear-and-convincing proof as permissible where withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment will result in death)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requires heightened proof in parental-rights termination because of irrevocable consequences)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (framework on choosing evidentiary standards under due process)
C.G., Matter of, 637 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1981) (applied clear-and-convincing standard to parental-bond severance; emphasizes protection against mistaken, irreversible decisions)
In re Baby Girl L., 51 P.3d 544 (Okla. 2002) (recognizes parens patriae power and the need for compelling state interest and specific findings before terminating parental rights)