Babcock v. Kijakazi, 595 U.S. 77

Dual‑status military technicians are federal civilian employees who assist the National Guard but are required as a condition of employment to maintain Guard membership and wear the uniform while working.
Technicians perform two separate roles: full‑time civilian technician work (paid by OPM and, for pre‑1984 hires, covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS)) and separate National Guard military service (part‑time drills, possible active duty, paid under military pay/pension systems).
David Babcock worked as a dual‑status technician (1975–2009), then retired and received a CSRS pension for his technician work and a separate military pension for Guard service.
The Social Security Administration granted Babcock benefits but applied the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) to reduce benefits because of his CSRS pension.
Babcock argued his CSRS pension was exempt from WEP as a payment “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service”; administrative review and the courts below denied relief.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split and held the CSRS pension for technician employment is not a payment “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.”

Issue	Babcock	Kijakazi (Acting Commissioner)	Held
Whether a CSRS pension for work as a dual‑status military technician is a “payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” under 42 U.S.C. §415(a)(7)(A)(III)	“As” should be read broadly — technician duties, uniform, and Guard control make the work functionally uniformed service (so CSRS pension is excepted)	“As” means in the role/capacity; statute and related laws classify technicians as civilian employees, so CSRS pension is civilian and not excepted	“As” means in the role/capacity; Congress classified dual‑status technicians as civilians for pay/benefits; CSRS pension is not based on service as a uniformed‑service member and does not fall within the exception (WEP reduction stands)

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (1906) (syllabus disclaimer regarding headnotes)
FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (statutory context informs plain‑meaning analysis)
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010) (interpreting the significance of statutory phrasing and context)
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (court will not decide unpressed alternative arguments)
Babcock v. Commissioner of Social Security, 959 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 2020) (district/circuit decision affirming SSA’s WEP application)
Petersen v. Astrue, 633 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2011) (alternative circuit view that technician pension could be treated as uniformed‑service pay)