Babb v. Wilkie
140 S. Ct. 1168
SCOTUS2020Background
- Noris Babb, a VA clinical pharmacist born in 1960, sued the Department of Veterans Affairs alleging age discrimination (and other claims) based on several personnel actions: loss of an "advanced scope" promotion designation, denial of training and clinic positions, and reassignment that reduced holiday pay.
- The VA moved for summary judgment; the District Court applied McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting, found Babb made a prima facie case but that the VA provided legitimate reasons which were not shown to be pretextual, and granted summary judgment for the VA.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed under its precedent; this Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split about the causation standard required by the federal-sector ADEA provision, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).
- § 633a(a) commands that "All personnel actions ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on age." The central question: does that require age to be a but-for cause of the personnel action (outcome) or only of any differential treatment (discrimination) during decisionmaking?
- The Court held that § 633a(a) prohibits personnel actions made with any age-based differential treatment: age must be a but-for cause of the differential treatment (discrimination), but need not be a but-for cause of the ultimate employment outcome.
- The Court clarified remedies: plaintiffs who cannot show age was a but-for cause of the ultimate personnel outcome cannot obtain relief altering or compensating for that outcome (e.g., reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages), but may obtain injunctive or forward-looking relief for discriminatory processes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Babb) | Defendant's Argument (VA/Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper causation standard under § 633a(a) | § 633a(a) forbids any consideration of age in making personnel actions; proof that age was a but-for cause of the ultimate decision is not required | § 633a(a) requires but-for causation of the personnel action (outcome); mere consideration is insufficient | Court: Age must be but-for cause of the differential treatment (discrimination), not necessarily of the ultimate personnel outcome; any age-based differential treatment taints the "making" of the action |
| Interaction with precedent requiring but-for causation (Gross, Nassar) | Those cases did not control because § 633a(a) uses different syntax focusing on the "making" of personnel actions | Government: default but-for rule and decisions like Gross and Nassar should govern | Court: Gross and Nassar are consistent because § 633a(a) requires but-for causation of discrimination (differential treatment) even if not of the final outcome |
| Available remedies when only nondispositive age consideration shown | Plaintiff: relief should be available for violations of § 633a(a) | Government: if outcome wouldn't differ, plaintiff lacks injury warranting outcome-based relief | Court: Outcome-altering relief (reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages) requires but-for causation of the outcome; nondispositive discrimination may support injunctive or prospective relief and other relief tied to the actual injury (e.g., process costs) |
| Whether federal sector must follow same standard as private/state employers | Babb: federal provision should prohibit any consideration as written | Government: should align with private-sector ADEA (but-for) | Court: Congress adopted a distinct federal-sector scheme; differing text supports stricter federal-sector rule and courts give effect to that choice |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (established burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (interpreting "based on" in FCRA; distinguished on statutory syntax)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (private-sector ADEA requires but-for causation of adverse action)
- Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation; discussed as background default rule)
- Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (noting textual differences between private- and federal-sector ADEA provisions)
- Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999) (holding no damages where government would have made same decision; cited in remedy analysis)
- Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (framework for interrelated causation and remedies in constitutional employment claims)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (describing "discrimination" as differential treatment)