2019 Ohio 510
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Student D.B., an eighth-grader, exhibited scratching/cutting and expressed suicidal statements to classmates in fall 2012. School counselor Julia Schwendeman learned of these concerns over several weeks.
- Schwendeman spoke with D.B., his teacher, the assistant principal, and D.B.’s father; D.B. denied abuse and at one point was taken to a hospital where doctors did not find him suicidal.
- On November 16, 2012, the mother of a friend told Schwendeman that D.B. had recently sent texts and told the friend he wanted to kill himself. Schwendeman did not notify D.B.’s father, meet with D.B., perform a risk assessment, or report the call to school personnel.
- A few days later D.B. committed suicide. His father sued Schwendeman, the school board, and the district for wrongful death, failure to report child abuse, and respondeat superior.
- On summary judgment the trial court granted immunity to the Board and others on some claims but denied Schwendeman immunity on the wrongful-death claim, finding a triable issue whether her conduct was reckless under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 2744. Schwendeman appealed.
- The Ninth District affirmed, holding a reasonable juror could find her conduct met the Restatement/Ohio definition of recklessness and thus immunity was not resolved in her favor on summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Schwendeman is immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) for wrongful death | Father: Schwendeman’s failure to report recent suicide-related statements was reckless, so immunity does not apply | Schwendeman: Actions were at most negligent or reasonable efforts; no conscious disregard or high-probability risk, so statutory immunity applies | Court: Denied summary judgment on immunity; reasonable juror could find recklessness (trial issue) |
| Proper legal standard for "reckless" conduct | Father: Recklessness defined by conscious disregard/indifference to known/obvious risk | Schwendeman: Cites earlier cases for a stricter or differently phrased test; argues need for subjective knowledge of high probability of harm | Court: Applies Anderson Restatement standard (objective or subjective formulations); recklessness can be measured by what a reasonable person in her position would have known |
| Whether the court misapplied facts or ignored Schwendeman’s prior interventions | Schwendeman: Prior efforts (assessments, calls, counseling referral) show no recklessness; the friend’s call gave no new/urgent information | Father: The friend’s mother relayed a recent explicit statement; failure to act on that new report was material | Held: Court must view facts favorably to plaintiff; prior efforts do not negate triable issue about failure to act on the new report |
| Whether hospital’s prior non-suicidal finding insulated Schwendeman from liability | Schwendeman: Hospital’s earlier finding shows no probable risk; thus non-reckless | Father: New and recent threat could change risk assessment | Held: Court properly declined to treat prior hospital finding as dispositive; triable issue remains whether later conduct created recklessness |
Key Cases Cited
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (summary judgment standard)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (summary judgment burden-shifting framework)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (de novo review of summary judgment)
- O’Toole v. Deniham, 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (discussed in recklessness context)
- Anderson v. City of Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (adopting Restatement definition of reckless conduct)
- Hackathorn v. Preisse, 104 Ohio App.3d 768 (contrast on immunity where precautions were taken)