922 F.3d 957
9th Cir.2019Background
- Ten Arizona foster children sued state agency directors (DCS and AHCCCS) alleging statewide policies deprived foster children of medical, dental, and mental-health services, violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process and the Medicaid Act (EPSDT).
- The district court certified a General Class (all children in DCS custody), a Non‑Kinship Subclass (those not placed with kin), and a Medicaid Subclass (those entitled to EPSDT services).
- Plaintiffs relied on DCS data, expert reports, internal materials, and excerpts of a representative plaintiff (B.K.) to show systemic failures (delays, poor coordination, overuse of congregate care, excessive caseloads).
- Defendants appealed interlocutorily the class-certification order; the Ninth Circuit reviewed standing and Rule 23(a)/(b)(2) factors for each class.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed certification of the General Class and the Non‑Kinship Subclass, but vacated certification of the Medicaid Subclass and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Standing and Rule 23 for General Class (due process) | B.K. has concrete injury and risk from statewide policies; representative standing suffices to certify class | Many class members receive adequate care so class lacks common injury; class rep may not represent all | B.K. has standing; commonality, typicality, and (b)(2) uniform injunctive relief satisfied; General Class affirmed |
| 2) Certification of Non‑Kinship Subclass (due process) | Same systemic practices (e.g., overuse of shelters, sibling separation) create common questions and risk; B.K. represents subclass | Subclass needs individualized inquiries; atypicality and lack of uniform relief | B.K. has standing; commonality, typicality, and (b)(2) uniform relief satisfied; Non‑Kinship Subclass affirmed |
| 3) Certification of Medicaid Subclass (EPSDT) | EPSDT claim can be certified class‑wide because same statewide practices cause pattern of noncompliance or risk of noncompliance | Medicaid claim differs from due process: risk alone isn’t a statutory violation; class lacks common factual predicate | Court vacated Medicaid Subclass certification: district court misconceived legal standard (cannot rely solely on risk without showing statutory violation or class‑wide significant risk); remanded for further findings |
| 4) Whether exposure to risk suffices for EPSDT injunctive relief | Plaintiffs: a significant, class‑wide risk of future Medicaid violations can support injunctive relief | Defendants: Medicaid requires actual violations (or proof of class‑wide imminent/significant risk) — risk theory insufficient | Majority: conceptually a risk theory can support certification, but district court failed to make requisite findings here; dissent would have affirmed certification |
Key Cases Cited
- Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) (statewide custody policies can create common questions where they expose all class members to a substantial risk of harm)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (commonality requires a common contention whose truth will resolve central issues “in one stroke”)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized, and imminent or actual injury fairly traceable to defendant and redressable)
- Katie A. v. Los Angeles County, 481 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (EPSDT requires provision of services listed in §1396d(a) and the state retains ultimate responsibility to ensure treatment)
- Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (once class representative has standing, the court proceeds to Rule 23 analysis)
- Sali v. Corona Regional Medical Center, 909 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2018) (standards for reviewing district court class‑certification factual findings and abuse of discretion)