B. Gregg Price, P.C. and B. Gregg Price v. Series 1- Virage Master Lp, 661 S.W.3d 419

Background

In 2015 Price's law firm borrowed $3,250,647.05 from Series 1–Virage Master LP and Price allegedly personally guaranteed the note; Virage sued after missed payments.
Virage served notice of an oral summary-judgment hearing set for April 2, 2020 and served the motion on March 12, 2020.
Harris County announced cancellation of nonessential in-person hearings in March 2020 due to COVID-19; Price's counsel relied on those announcements and believed the April 2 hearing was canceled.
On April 1 counsel contacted the court clerk, who said the motion would be taken on the court’s submission docket but did not provide amended written notice; counsel filed a response April 1 and Virage moved to strike it as untimely.
On April 2 the trial court struck Price’s response, granted summary judgment to Virage, and later denied Price’s motion for new trial; the court of appeals affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court held Price lacked adequate notice of a rescheduled hearing, that his due-process rights were violated, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Adequacy of notice for a rescheduled hearing after COVID cancellations	Price: original notice was nullified by public cancellations; no amended notice was given; proceeding by submission without notice violated due process	Virage: original notice and subsequent filings sufficed; Price should have filed objections or acted	Court: cancellations nullified original notice; no amended notice was given; submission without notice violated due process; summary judgment reversed
Whether Virage’s April 1 motion to strike gave adequate notice that the hearing would proceed by submission	Price: the motion did not communicate a rescheduled hearing date; clerk’s informal comment was insufficient	Virage: motion to strike (and brief notice) put Price on notice and created an opportunity to seek relief	Court: motion to strike did not substitute for written amended notice; Price was entitled to rely on public cancellation notices
Applicability of Craddock new-trial rule vs Carpenter exception	Price: Craddock applies because lack of notice makes judgment constitutionally infirm; he had no duty to seek other remedies	Virage: Carpenter applies to require use of procedural remedies (continuance/leave) before invoking Craddock	Court: Carpenter inapplicable because here the hearing was canceled; Craddock governs and entitles a new trial when lack of notice caused default
Whether Price had to plead a meritorious defense to obtain a new trial	Price: not required where lack of notice; constitutional infirmity dispenses with second Craddock element	Virage: argued procedural remedies were available so usual standards should apply	Court: per precedent, meritorious-defense element is not required when judgment follows from lack of proper notice

Key Cases Cited

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties and afford an opportunity to be heard)
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (opportunity to be heard must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner)
Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. 1998) (notice of summary-judgment hearing must state exact hearing date or submission)
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm'n Op. 1939) (sets rule for new trial after post-answer default: inadvertence, meritorious defense, and no prejudice)
Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2002) (Craddock inapplicable where nonmovant had proper notice and other procedural remedies were available)
Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2005) (when lack of notice causes default, courts may dispense with Craddock’s meritorious-defense requirement for constitutional reasons)
Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988) (a judgment entered without proper notice is constitutionally infirm)