B.D. ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5189
| D.C. Cir. | 2016Background
- B.D., a child with documented disabilities, received special-education services from DCPS; he attended the private Katherine Thomas School (paid by DCPS) in 2011 but regressed and made little educational progress.
- DCPS adopted an October 2011 IEP that parents (the Davises) challenged as inadequate; parents paid for limited in-home services they could afford and sought further assessments and a residential therapeutic placement (Meridell).
- The Davises filed an administrative complaint; the hearing officer found DCPS denied B.D. a FAPE from Aug–Oct 2011 and continued to deny a FAPE through March 2012 for multiple IEP and placement deficiencies.
- The hearing officer ordered reimbursement for some parent-funded services and awarded five hours/week of intensive occupational therapy for three months as compensatory education, declined other compensatory requests, and directed updated assessments and interim services.
- The Davises sued in district court contesting the adequacy of compensatory education, seeking enforcement of favorable portions of the hearing decision (including full reimbursement), and seeking an injunction to require DCPS to secure a therapeutic residential placement; the district court ruled for DCPS on counts 1–3 and for the Davises on fees; the Davises appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of compensatory education award | Davises: award was too limited; hearing officer should have provided a program to restore lost educational progress caused by the FAPE denial | DCPS: five hours/week OT for three months was adequate and other requested services were insufficiently explained | Reversed district court as to this count; remand to fashion compensatory relief to put B.D. in the position he would be in but for the Aug 2011–Mar 2012 FAPE denial (or remand to hearing officer) |
| Whether 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) provides a cause of action to enforce a hearing officer decision | Davises: statute allows any party "aggrieved by the findings and decision" to sue and should permit enforcement of favorable decisions | DCPS: a prevailing party is not "aggrieved by the findings and decision"; the statute of limitations running from the decision shows Congress did not intend it for enforcement actions | Held for DCPS: § 1415(i)(2)(A) does not provide an enforcement cause of action |
| Federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for enforcement suit | Davises: § 1331 supplies jurisdiction to enforce the hearing decision | DCPS: jurisdiction exists but there is no cause of action to invoke | Court: § 1331 supplies jurisdiction but does not supply a cause of action; plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable federal cause of action |
| Request for injunction requiring DCPS to find a residential placement | Davises: injunction required to secure therapeutic residential placement or interim services while IEP/placement finalized | DCPS: claim moot because an updated appropriate IEP and an offered residential placement (Eagleton) exist | Affirmed for DCPS: injunction claim moot (Davises conceded appropriateness of the Oct 2012 IEP and Eagleton placement for purposes of the appeal) |
Key Cases Cited
- Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (discussing IDEA’s FAPE guarantee)
- Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir.) (standard for compensatory education remedy)
- Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054 (D.C. Cir.) (district’s discretion to fashion remedies for IDEA violations)
- Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (statutory text governs clear statutory meaning)
- Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir.) (predecessor statute: enforcement suits not brought by those "aggrieved" by decision)
- Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108 (1st Cir.) (permitting enforcement under § 1415(i)(2)(A); courts relied on IDEA purpose)
- D.E. v. Central Dauphin School District, 765 F.3d 260 (3d Cir.) (followed Nieves-Márquez on enforcement under § 1415(i)(2)(A))
- Blackman v. District of Columbia, 456 F.3d 167 (D.C. Cir.) (noting in dicta that prevailing administrative parties may lack IDEA cause under § 1415(i)(2)(A))