B.C. VS. V.C. (FV-03-1788-16 AND FV-03-1789-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)
A-5323-15T2
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Jun 23, 2017Background
- B.C. (plaintiff) filed separate SASPA complaints on May 11, 2016 on behalf of her two minor daughters, alleging sexual assaults by their father, V.C., that occurred from 2013 through March 2015.
- SASPA (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -23) became effective May 9, 2016 — two days before the complaints were filed — but the alleged conduct predated SASPA by ~14 months.
- A temporary SASPA restraining order issued May 11, 2016 barred V.C. from any contact with the children.
- In Family Part proceedings, the court concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16 (SASPA’s preponderance-of-the-evidence standard) was unconstitutional as applied because parental contact restrictions implicate a liberty interest requiring clear-and-convincing proof; the court dismissed the SASPA complaints on that basis.
- On appeal, the Appellate Division declined to decide the constitutional question, holding instead SASPA does not apply retroactively and therefore could not provide relief for alleged acts that occurred before the statute’s enactment.
- The court affirmed dismissal of the SASPA complaints on the nonretroactivity ground and noted a later statutory amendment directing such allegations involving unemancipated minors and caregivers be reported to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SASPA applies to alleged sexual assaults that occurred before SASPA's effective date | SASPA should apply; plaintiffs seek protection for the children despite prior conduct | SASPA cannot be applied retroactively to conduct that predated the statute | SASPA does not apply retroactively; complaints dismissed on that basis |
| Whether the preponderance standard in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16 is constitutionally sufficient when a parent–child contact ban is at stake | Clear-and-convincing standard is required (relying on parental liberty and prior visitation/fitness jurisprudence) | Preponderance is the statutory standard; court found issue contested | Trial court found preponderance insufficient and required clear-and-convincing, but Appellate Division did not decide the constitutional question because nonretroactivity resolved the case |
| Whether, if clear-and-convincing standard applies, the trial court should have held a hearing instead of dismissing | Court should have held a hearing and applied the higher standard rather than dismissing | Dismissal was appropriate given the statutory and factual posture | Appellate Division did not reach this question because it disposed of the case on nonretroactivity |
| Whether SASPA qualifies as curative or shows legislative intent to apply retroactively | Plaintiff argued equitable considerations and child-protection needs might warrant retroactivity | Defendant argued absence of legislative retroactivity language and SASPA’s new substantive rights weigh against retroactivity | No legislative intent for retroactivity; SASPA is not curative and parties had no reasonable expectation of retroactive relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Landers v. Landers, 444 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2016) (deference to Family Part factual findings)
- Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 (legal-review standard; appellate review of legal conclusions)
- Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (Family Part expertise in family disputes)
- D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168 (standard of review for legal determinations)
- O'Keefe v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 132 N.J. 234 (avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings)
- Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 (presumption against retroactive application of statutes and framework for analysis)
- Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515 (retroactivity principles and sensible statutory interpretation)
- D.C. v. F.R., 286 N.J. Super. 589 (retroactivity and curative statute analysis)
- Nelson v. Bd. of Educ., 148 N.J. 358 (definition and limits of curative statutes)
- V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200 (visitation may be denied when clear and convincing proof shows harm or parental unfitness)
