B-21 Wines, Inc. v. Guy, 548 F.Supp.3d 555

Plaintiffs: North Carolina consumers and B-21 Wines (Florida retailer) challenge North Carolina statutes that bar out-of-state wine retailers from shipping directly to NC consumers. Plaintiffs say the statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Defendants: A.D. Guy (Chair, NC Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission); Joshua Stein (NC Attorney General) was dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds earlier in the case.
Statutes challenged: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18B-102.1, 18B-109, and 18B-900(a)(2), which together prohibit out-of-state retail shipments and restrict ABC permits to (generally) in-state applicants; wineries (producers) have a limited shipper exception under § 18B-1001.1.
Legal framework: court applied the dormant Commerce Clause two-step (discrimination inquiry, then balancing) but considered the Twenty-First Amendment as potentially insulating discriminatory alcohol regulations that are essential to a three-tier system.
Three-tier system context: North Carolina requires alcohol to move from producers → in-state wholesalers → in-state retailers; the State argues the challenged rules preserve that system and its public-health and regulatory aims.
Disposition: The court held the statutes are facially discriminatory but are protected by § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment as essential to the three-tier system; granted defendant’s summary judgment, denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment, and denied the motion to strike as moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NC statutes banning direct shipments from out-of-state retailers violate the dormant Commerce Clause	The ban discriminates against out-of-state retailers and is not saved by the Twenty-First Amendment	The ban is a permitted, essential feature of NC’s legitimate three-tier regulatory scheme and thus is saved by § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment	The statutes are facially discriminatory but are upheld under the Twenty-First Amendment as essential to the three-tier system; defendant wins
Whether exclusion of out-of-state retailers can be reconciled with precedents allowing limited shipper exceptions for producers/wineries	Plaintiffs relied on precedent invalidating discrimination against producers/wineries	Defendant distinguished producers (first tier) from retailers (third tier) and argued allowing out-of-state retailers to ship would eviscerate the three-tier system	Court agreed with defendant: producers differ from retailers; allowing out-of-state retailers to ship would undermine the three-tier system, so statutes stand

Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019) (explains dormant Commerce Clause review for state alcohol regulations and role of § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment)
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (recognizes legitimacy of three-tier regulatory scheme but limits discrimination against out-of-state producers)
Lebamoff Enters., Inc. v. Whitmer, 956 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2020) (upheld Michigan ban on direct shipments by out-of-state retailers as essential to the three-tier system)
Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003) (invalidated North Carolina restriction on direct shipments by out-of-state wineries; distinguishes producers from retailers)
Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 2021) (upheld state liquor laws in part because plaintiffs attacked core three-tier provisions)
Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (describes dormant Commerce Clause concern with economic protectionism)