584 U.S. 726
SCOTUS2018Background
- Jane Doe, an unaccompanied minor in ORR custody, was eight weeks pregnant and requested an abortion while held in a federally funded Texas shelter.
- ORR policy barred shelter staff from facilitating abortions without the ORR Director’s approval, except in emergencies.
- Doe’s guardian ad litem (Garza) sued seeking injunctive relief to allow Doe to obtain an abortion; the District Court issued a temporary restraining order permitting the procedure.
- A D.C. Circuit panel vacated the TRO; the full D.C. Circuit (en banc) vacated that panel decision and remanded, resulting in a favorable ruling for Garza.
- Garza’s counsel arranged for Doe to obtain the abortion earlier than the government expected, and Doe underwent the procedure before this Court could consider an emergency stay, mooting the individual injunctive claim.
- The Government petitioned for certiorari asking this Court to decide whether the en banc judgment should be vacated under Munsingwear because the claim became moot through the unilateral action of those who prevailed below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Doe’s individual claim is moot and whether vacatur of the D.C. Circuit’s en banc order is appropriate under Munsingwear when mootness resulted from the prevailing party’s unilateral action | Garza: Despite mootness, the judgment should stand; no misconduct warranting denial of vacatur | Government: Mootness resulted from Garza’s unilateral action; equity favors vacatur to prevent a prevailing party from profiting from voluntary mootness | Court granted certiorari, concluded the claim was moot due to unilateral action, and VACATED the en banc order and REMANDED with instruction to dismiss the individual injunctive claim as moot under Munsingwear |
| Whether alleged misrepresentations by Garza’s counsel should prevent vacatur | Garza: Allegations are baseless; not a reason to deny vacatur | Government: Counsel made material misrepresentations/omissions designed to thwart review and should preclude vacatur | Court said it takes such allegations seriously but did not resolve misconduct claims; the balance of equities and circumstances supported vacatur here |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (establishes vacatur of lower-court judgments when a case becomes moot on its way to the Supreme Court)
- Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (vacatur appropriate when mootness results from unilateral action of prevailing party)
- U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (discusses equitable principles limiting relief when a case becomes moot)
- Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (constitutional standard for abortion regulations; Court noted government assumed a constitutional right for purposes of the case)
- Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U.S. 466 (1915) (equitable considerations guide vacatur decisions)
- Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 564 U.S. 1001 (2011) (examples where mootness after certiorari filing still resulted in vacatur/remand)
- United States v. Samish Indian Nation, 568 U.S. 936 (2012) (per curiam) (example of voluntary dismissal after certiorari leading to dismissal)
- Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (example where post-judgment transactions mooted review)
