311 F.R.D. 1
D.D.C.2015Background
- Plaintiff Nursat Aygen sued DC Public Schools in 2010 alleging FMLA violations and proceeded pro se.
- Aygen repeatedly failed to appear for her own depositions (at least four), prompting defendant's motion to dismiss.
- The Court dismissed the case with prejudice in March 2015 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) and 41(b) for failure to prosecute and cooperate with discovery.
- Aygen argued her deposition could not occur until another witness (Talley-Melvin) was deposed; the Court found that scheduling irrelevant to Aygen’s obligation to attend her own deposition.
- Aygen moved post-judgment for reconsideration and for sanctions, alleging opposing counsel misconduct but failing to identify a specific Rule 60(b) ground or explain how any alleged misconduct prevented her from presenting her case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judgment should be set aside under Rule 60(b) | Aygen alleges misconduct by opposing counsel and seeks reconsideration/sanctions (no specific Rule 60(b) subsection identified) | D.C. Public Schools relied on prior dismissal for failure to appear and argued no basis to reopen judgment | Denied — Aygen did not show fraud, misrepresentation, or that misconduct prevented presentation of her case; no Rule 60(b)(6) extraordinary circumstances shown |
| Whether alleged opposing counsel dishonesty qualifies as Rule 60(b)(3) fraud/misrepresentation | Aygen contends counsel was dishonest (generally) | Defendant denies any basis to vacate judgment; emphasizes Aygen’s discovery failures | Denied — plaintiff failed to demonstrate misconduct that affected the outcome or hindered her ability to present her case |
| Whether reconsideration is warranted as an "extraordinary circumstance" under Rule 60(b)(6) | Aygen reasserts prior scheduling-based arguments (Talley‑Melvin deposition) | Defendant asserts those arguments were previously rejected and are irrelevant | Denied — motion repeats prior arguments and would be futile; does not meet extraordinary-circumstances standard |
| Whether sanctions against opposing counsel are appropriate post-judgment | Aygen seeks sanctions based on alleged misrepresentation (no rule cited; remedy unspecified) | Defendant contends no factual or legal basis for sanctions | Denied — plaintiff cites no rule, fails to show prejudicial effect, and offers no viable sanctionable claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (elements required for Rule 60(b)(3) relief)
- Marino v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 685 F.3d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances)
- Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, 355 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D.D.C. 2005) (motions for reconsideration should not relitigate same theory)
- Cornish v. Dudas, 813 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011) (reconsideration is an unusual measure)
- Kittner v. Gates, 783 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (motions for reconsideration disfavored)
- Murray v. District of Columbia, 52 F.3d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (vacating judgment must not be an empty or futile gesture)
- Kareem v. FDIC, 811 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D.D.C. 2011) (district court has discretion to grant or deny Rule 60(b) relief)