Axelberg v. Commissioner of Public Safety
2014 Minn. LEXIS 237
Minn.2014Background
- Jennifer Axelberg's license was revoked under Minnesota's implied consent law after a DWI chemical test resulting in .16 BAC.
- Axelberg argued at the implied consent hearing that her driving was necessary to escape imminent domestic violence from her husband.
- The district court and court of appeals rejected necessity as a defense at implied consent hearings.
- The Supreme Court held that the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b) limits the hearing to listed issues and does not include necessity.
- Dissenting justices argued necessity is relevant to avoid manifest injustice and should be considered under at least clause (8).
- The majority affirmed the license revocation, explaining the implied consent hearing is a complete statutory scheme with a narrow scope.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether necessity is permitted at an implied consent hearing | Axelberg: necessity is available under the statute | Commissioner: necessity is not within the ten listed topics | Not permitted; statute limits scope to clauses (1)-(10) and excludes necessity |
| Whether the implied consent statute precludes common-law defenses like necessity | Common-law defenses should be available absent express abrogation | Statute's structure and Brekke/Urban guidance imply abrogation | Statute unambiguously limits defenses to those listed; necessity barred |
| Whether the majority's reading creates an absurd result or violates legislative intent | Reading should avoid manifest injustice to domestic violence victims | Plain language should govern; no ambiguity | Majority's reading does not adopt a common-law exception; dissent argues for nuance among canons |
| Whether post-driving alcohol consumption defenses (Dutcher) inform this case | Dutcher supports recognizing post-driving consumption defenses | Dutcher not controlling under implied consent framework | Dutcher not controlling; implied consent limits differ from criminal/post-driving contexts |
| Whether reform by Legislature is appropriate to protect domestic-violence victims | Policy favors allowing necessity to protect victims | Legislature should address policy; court cannot rewrite statutes | Legislature, not court, should revise if public policy requires change |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424 (Minn. 1970) (preponderance burden in implied consent hearing)
- Goldsworthy v. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. 1978) (public safety purpose of implied consent law)
- Prideaux v. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405 (Minn. 1976) (civil vs. criminal aspects; public safety interest)
- Johnson v. State, 289 Minn. 196 (Minn. 1971) (necessity defense in emergency situations)
- Hage v. State, 595 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1999) (necessity related to post-driving or criminal context)
- Brekke v. THM Biomedical, Inc., 688 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 2004) (canon of derogation of common law; abrogation must be express or by implication)
- Neuberger v. Hennepin Cnty. Workhouse, 340 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1979) (estoppel/time-bar exceptional application in a remedial regime)