Awuku-Asare v. Garland, 991 F.3d 1123

Daniel Awuku-Asare, a Ghanaian national, entered the U.S. on an F-1 student visa (admitted for duration of status).
In August 2017 he transferred to Rhema Bible Training College but was arrested two weeks later on a rape charge; he was incarcerated ~13 months and later acquitted.
While incarcerated he was not pursuing a full course of study and therefore ceased to maintain F-1 status.
DHS served a Notice to Appear charging removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for failing to maintain nonimmigrant status; an IJ ordered removal and the BIA affirmed.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Awuku-Asare argued (issue of first impression) that § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) requires the failure to maintain status be attributable to the nonimmigrant (i.e., fault or an affirmative act), and he also challenged whether substantial evidence supported removability.

Issue	Awuku-Asare's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) requires that a noncitizen's failure to maintain nonimmigrant status be attributable to the noncitizen (fault/affirmative-act requirement).	The statute's active voice means the nonimmigrant must have caused or acted to produce the failure; absence of fault negates removability.	The statute plainly makes removable any noncitizen who "has failed to maintain" status; no textual fault or affirmative-act requirement.	The court held the statute unambiguous: no fault/affirmative-act requirement; failure need not be the noncitizen's fault.
Whether the removal order lacked substantial evidence because the BIA did not consider whether Awuku-Asare was at fault for the lapse in status.	If fault is required, the record lacks substantial evidence that Awuku-Asare caused the lapse.	The undisputed record shows he did not pursue a full course of study while incarcerated, satisfying the statutory predicate for removability.	Because the court rejected the fault-based interpretation, the substantial-evidence challenge fails and the BIA's decision is affirmed.

Lee v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2008) (interpreting "terminate" and "abandon" to require an affirmative act by the student in that statutory context)
Exby-Stolley v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 979 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2020) (court may not add words to an unambiguous statute)
Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2017) (standard of review: BIA legal determinations reviewed de novo; factual findings for substantial-evidence)
Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining substantial-evidence review of BIA factual findings)
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (do not consult extratextual sources when statutory language is clear)
Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) (same principle on relying on text when unambiguous)
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (express statutory exceptions imply Congress knew how to create exceptions elsewhere)
Copeland ex rel. Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 136 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998) (reluctance to impose unexpressed, implied limitations on statutes)
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (canon of constitutional avoidance applies only if statutory ambiguity exists)
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (constitutional-avoidance canon has no application absent statutory ambiguity)