Avila v. Los Angeles Police Department
758 F.3d 1096
9th Cir.2014Background
- Leonard Avila, an LAPD officer, testified under subpoena in a FLSA suit (Maciel) that he and many officers routinely worked through lunch without claiming overtime. Shortly after, LAPD initiated an internal complaint against Avila for insubordination (failing to submit overtime requests).
- Avila resigned mid-Board of Rights (BOR) hearing; the BOR proceeded in absentia, found him guilty, and the Chief ordered termination. Avila later sued the City and LAPD under FLSA § 215(a)(3) (anti-retaliation), § 1983, and California law.
- The district court barred Avila from relitigating BOR factual findings but allowed his FLSA retaliation claim to proceed; a jury returned verdict for Avila on the FLSA claim and awarded damages and later liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees.
- On appeal the City argued (1) BOR findings preclude Avila’s FLSA claim and (2) the jury instructions were erroneous (including failure to give a “same decision” instruction and refusal of two clarifying instructions about use of testimony vs. admissions).
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: BOR findings lacked preclusive effect on motive/retaliation; the district court did not abuse discretion in refusing the supplemental instructions because the record lacked an evidentiary foundation for the City’s same-decision defense; fee and liquidated-damages awards were also affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Avila's Argument | City of Los Angeles's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BOR decision precludes Avila’s FLSA retaliation claim (issue preclusion) | BOR did not decide motive/retaliation; Avila may litigate retaliation in federal court | BOR finding of insubordination precludes relitigation of retaliation claim | BOR did not resolve retaliation motive; no issue preclusion (administrative finding lacked determination on motive) |
| Proper causation instruction for FLSA retaliation (motivating-factor vs. but-for / "same decision" defense) | Required instruction was that protected testimony was a motivating factor; jury should decide pretext | Requested mixed-motive instruction including "same decision" affirmative defense (City must show it would have fired Avila regardless) | Court permissibly gave motivating-factor instruction; City waived some arguments; no evidentiary basis existed on this record for a "same decision" instruction |
| Whether district court erred by refusing two special instructions clarifying that admissions during testimony can justify discipline | Special instructions unnecessary; Avila’s claim was that termination was retaliatory pretext, not immunity for admissions | Special instructions were needed to distinguish protected act (testifying) from admissions of misconduct that could independently justify firing | Refusal was not an abuse of discretion: evidence showed discipline was tied to having testified, and no additional evidentiary foundation supported the City’s proposed clarifying instructions |
| Award of attorneys’ fees and liquidated damages under FLSA | Fees and liquidated damages appropriate for prevailing FLSA plaintiff | Awards excessive / improper punitive purpose for liquidated damages | District court’s fee reductions and liquidated-damages award were reasonable; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (administrative finding preclusion when agency expressly resolves retaliation issue)
- Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994) (three-part test for preclusive effect of administrative determinations)
- Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (standards for reviewing preclusion defenses)
- Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying motivating-factor/mixed-motive analysis in FLSA retaliation context)
- Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (failure to give same-decision instruction can be harmless when evidence strongly supports retaliation conclusion)
- Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011) (policy rationale for strong anti-retaliation protection under FLSA)
- Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (liquidated damages under FLSA serve compensatory and deterrent purposes)