45 F. Supp. 3d 110
D.D.C.2014Background
- René and Nancy Avila, proceeding pro se, own residential property in Moreno Valley, California; CitiFinancial was original beneficiary and CitiMortgage later became beneficiary after a merger.
- Quality Loan Service Corp. was substituted as trustee and sent notices of default and trustee’s sale; plaintiffs later stated no foreclosure sale was effectuated.
- Plaintiffs sued multiple mortgage servicers, trustees, law firms, and individuals alleging violations of a D.C. consent decree (United States v. Bank of America), the FDCPA, California’s Rosenthal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983/1985/1986, fraud, due process violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; they sought injunctive and monetary relief.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), (3), and (6) (venue, jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim); plaintiffs opposed.
- The Court found venue improper in D.C. (all operative events occurred in California; defendants do not reside in D.C.; consent decree did not create third-party enforcement rights), concluded plaintiffs lack standing for foreclosure-based relief because no sale occurred, and identified substantive defects in statutory and tort claims.
- Because the complaint was substantively deficient and substantially similar to a previously dismissed pro se filing, the Court dismissed the action rather than transferring it to California.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venue — is D.C. proper? | Venue proper based on enforcement provision of D.C. consent decree | Events occurred in California; defendants do not reside in D.C.; consent decree does not confer private enforcement/venue | Venue improper in D.C.; consent decree not a basis for venue |
| Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 — dismiss or transfer? | Implied request to proceed in D.C.; pro se status favors transfer | Case suffers substantive defects; prior similar dismissal warrants dismissal | Dismissal rather than transfer is appropriate in the interest of justice |
| Standing for foreclosure claims | Foreclosure attempts injured plaintiffs and violate consent decree and statutes | Plaintiffs concede no foreclosure sale occurred; therefore no injury in fact | Plaintiffs lack Article III standing for foreclosure relief |
| FDCPA / Rosenthal Act — are defendants debt collectors? | Foreclosure notices and conduct violate debt collection laws | Defendants are creditors/servicers/trustees, not ‘‘debt collectors’’ under the statutes; assignment predated default | Claims under FDCPA and Rosenthal Act dismissed |
| Fraud and related tort claims | Defendants made false representations and committed fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress | Complaint lacks elements: no pleaded justifiable reliance (fraud); foreclosure conduct not extreme or outrageous (IIED) | Fraud and IIED claims dismissed for failure to plead required elements |
| § 1983/§ 1985/§ 1986 claims | Defendants conspired and deprived plaintiffs of constitutional rights | Defendants are private actors, not state actors; no class-based discriminatory animus alleged | § 1983, § 1985, § 1986 claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se pleadings must be liberally construed)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must state plausible claim; conclusory allegations not presumed true)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Jerman v. Carlisle, 559 U.S. 573 (2010) (scope and definition of debt collectors under FDCPA)
- West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (§ 1983 requires action under color of state law)
- Ananiev v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 968 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2013) (consent decree did not create private enforcement rights; venue improper)
- Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (government consent judgments are enforceable only by parties absent an express third-party enforcement provision)