66 F. Supp. 3d 466
S.D.N.Y.2014Background
- Eight plaintiffs who worked in buildings on Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) land sued for injuries from cleaning WTC collapse dust; they failed to serve the 90‑day notices of claim required for suits against public entities.
- Courts originally dismissed five of those complaints for failure to serve timely notices; others were not dismissed for various procedural reasons.
- New York Legislature enacted "Jimmy Nolan’s Law" (2009), which revived time‑barred World Trade Center rescue/recovery/cleanup personal‑injury claims and gave a one‑year window to serve claims; plaintiffs used that revival to refile/serve BPCA.
- BPCA moved for summary judgment arguing the revival law, as applied to BPCA, violates the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution by reviving extinguished claims and imposing new liability on BPCA.
- The court found BPCA is not merely a political subdivision for these purposes (it issues bonds, is financially independent, and the statute exposes its general fund to revived liabilities), so it has capacity to challenge the state law.
- The court held Jimmy Nolan’s Law was an unconstitutional revival as applied to BPCA because the statutory exceptions that have justified revivals (e.g., total inability to sue, latent‑injury discovery gaps) were not present here given the discovery rule and extensive litigation/publicity; plaintiffs’ claims remained barred for failure to timely serve notices.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BPCA has capacity/standing to challenge Jimmy Nolan’s Law | Plaintiffs/AG: BPCA is a public entity lacking capacity to challenge state law | BPCA: as an independent public benefit corporation with bond obligations and separate finances, it can challenge state action that burdens its property | Held: BPCA has capacity to challenge the law (independent public benefit corporation) |
| Whether Jimmy Nolan’s Law violates NY Const. art. I, §6 (due process) by reviving extinguished claims against BPCA | Plaintiffs/AG: Revival is permissible under precedents allowing exceptional revivals to avoid injustice | BPCA: Revival is an unconstitutional taking of property/financial burden because no exceptional circumstances exist here | Held: Law unconstitutional as applied to BPCA — revival not justified; due process violated |
| Whether the statutory rationales (misinformation, delayed causation recognition, lack of awareness of limitations) suffice as "exceptional circumstances" to revive claims | Plaintiffs: those rationales justify revival to avoid injustice | BPCA: those rationales are insufficient; discovery rule already protected plaintiffs with latent injuries | Held: Rationales insufficient; discovery rule and access to courts negate exceptional‑circumstance justification |
| Whether preexisting discovery‑rule protections (CPLR §214‑c/214‑e) made revival unnecessary | Plaintiffs: revival still appropriate to rectify injustice | BPCA: discovery rule addresses latent injuries, so revival is extreme and unwarranted | Held: Discovery rule undermines need for revival; statute fails Gallewski/Hopkins standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164 (1950) (revival tolerable only under exceptional circumstances to avoid serious injustice)
- Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N.Y. 213 (1922) (described revival statutes as an "extreme exercise of legislative power")
- Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989) (upheld revival and discovery‑rule reform for latent‑injury DES claims)
- Clark‑Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382 (1987) (requires a particularized inquiry to treat a public benefit corporation like the State)
- Patterson v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 714 (1977) (public authority permitted to challenge legislation when independent bond interests and private financing are implicated)
- Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 238 N.Y. 271 (1924) (discussed when immunity from suit/unjustness might warrant legislative change)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine issue of material fact)