AVENDANO v. BALZA, 442 F.Supp.3d 417

Petitioner Veronica Luz Malaver Avendano sought the return of her son G* (b. 2008) from Massachusetts to his habitual residence, Margarita Island, Venezuela, under the Hague Convention/ICARA; Respondent is the child’s father, Leonardo Alfonzo Blanco Balza.
G traveled with Balza to Medford in August 2018 pursuant to a Venezuelan visitation order; Balza refused to return him when Avendano would not authorize a U.S. passport after G obtained U.S. citizenship in September 2018.
G* has lived with Balza in Massachusetts since August 2018, enrolled in school, learned English, and consistently stated he wants to remain in the U.S. with his father.
The court appointed a Guardian ad Litem and heard testimony (trial Dec. 10–13, 2019) from both parents, the child, two psychological experts, and witnesses about conditions on Margarita Island and in Venezuela generally.
Experts and the GAL found G* articulate, consistent, and not unduly coached; evidence showed severe political/economic problems in Venezuela, but local witnesses described Margarita Island as relatively functional.
Court found by a preponderance that G* is a "mature child" under Article 13 whose views should be considered, and in its discretion denied Avendano’s petition for return (refused to order repatriation).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Avendano)	Defendant's Argument (Balza)	Held
Whether G* is a mature child under Article 13 whose objection to return should be considered	Avendano argued G* is too young and his statements were coached; maturity exception should not bar return	Balza argued G* is sufficiently mature, consistent, rational, and not unduly influenced; his wishes merit weight	Court held G* is a mature child (preponderance); his views should be considered and weigh heavily against return
Whether return to Venezuela would pose a "grave risk" of physical or psychological harm under Article 13(b)	Avendano argued return is required despite country conditions; failure to authorize passport does not justify retention	Balza asserted that dire political/economic/health conditions in Venezuela (State Dept., UN, expert testimony) bear on the child’s objection and may show grave risk	Court did not decide grave-risk exception; found country conditions relevant to why child objects but relied on mature-child exception and exercised discretion to deny return

Díaz-Alarcón v. Flández-Marcel, 944 F.3d 303 (1st Cir. 2019) (assessing maturity exception; child’s positive/negative country memories support considered choice)
Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (Hague Convention presumption favoring return; exceptions construed narrowly)
Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000) (purpose of Convention: restore pre-removal status quo and discourage forum-shopping)
Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000) (grave-risk exception requires harm greater than normal parental transfer; high threshold)
McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 2005) (examples of children found mature under Article 13 and discussion of coaching and appreciation of consequences)
De Aguiar Dias v. De Souza, 212 F. Supp. 3d 259 (D. Mass. 2016) (distinguishing neighborhood risk versus specific grave risk to child)
Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001) (economic/educational losses alone do not establish grave risk)
Tsa-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (Article 13 maturity determination is case-by-case)
Cabas v. Barr, 928 F.3d 177 (1st Cir. 2019) (recognizing Venezuela’s worsening conditions relevant to asylum and country-risk analysis)